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ABSTRACT: 
ACCESS TO SOCIAL 5ECURITY BENEfiTS BY MEM8ERS OF ET!INIC 
MINORITIES IN FRANCE 
BY J ANE BALLANTYNE 
This thesis examines the way In which the social security system in 
France treats non-nationals and members of ethnic minorities. The 
investigation covers three main areas: consumption of benefits by non-
nationals; legal entitlement members of ethnic minorities, and 
administrative and cultural barriers to take-up. 
It is demonstrated, with the evidence of the cost-benefit analyses on 
immigration produced in the late 1970s, that non-nationals, and 
especially those from outside the EEC, are not ~ disproportionate 
drain on the social security system, and indeed that it is probable 
that immigration has contributed to a lower deficit in the social 
security budget than would otherwise be the case. 
An analysis of the detail of French social security legislation 
concludes that, far from reflecting the just and equitable principles 
which underpin it, ethnic minority claimants suffer a high degree of 
legal discrimination. The interplay between immigration law and 
social security entitlement, and the cultural assumptions upon which 
social security Jaw is based, are shown to be the principal causes of 
such discrimination. 
The practical application of social security law to members of ethnic 
minorities is investigated by means of an analysis of the demands of 
the claiming process for selected benefits. Evidence from a number of 
sources, including anecdotal evidence gathered from interviews carried 
out in France, leads to a number of preliminary conclusions. Poor 
language and literacy skills; fear and mistrust of an alien 
bureaucracy, and discriminatory treatment by social security officials 
contribute to the creation of barriers to the full realisation of 
social security entitlement by members of ethnic minorities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policy in Western Europe this century, and 
particularly since 1945, has developed, not surprisingly, in 
direct response to the economic needs of the host countries. In 
the 1950s immigration from both Southern Europe, and from the 
Third World into the main industrial nations increased 
dramatically. The labour and skill shortages hampering post-war 
reconstruction led to recruitment of workers abroad - from Italy, 
Spain and Yugoslavia, and later from North-West Africa, workers 
came to the car factories and building sites of France; and 
London Transport recruited directly in the West Indies. 
Official immigration policy developed on an ad hoc basis, 
legitimising existing practices and responding to the needs of 
employers. Immigration controls reflected the general aim of 
recruiting to fill the gaps in the workforce. As such, in France 
a system of work and residence permits developed which restricted 
immigrants to certain types of work, and to settlement in 
designated departements. O.N.I. <Office National d'Immigration-
the organisation responsible for co-ordinating recruitment and 
settlement of immigrant workers> carried out extensive health 
checks on prospective entrants. This was intended to ensure that 
only those workers who were physically fit were given entry 
clearance; such workers would be an asset to the workforce and 
unlikely to incur expensive medical costs. The entry of 
dependants was not encouraged in the case of Third World 
immigrants, since they were of no economic benefit to France. (1) 
In the 1950s across Western Europe public perceptions were, on 
the whole, favourable to immigration. Immigrant workers were 
generally accepted as making a necessary and useful contribution 
to reconstruction and post war growth. With the onset of the oil 
crisis and spiralling unemployment, both public perceptions and 
immigration policy changed dramatically. There was no longer a 
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need to import labour. As such primary immigration was stopped 
in France in 1974 and in the UK in 1973, with the implementation 
of the 1971 Immigration Act. 
The recession hit those sectors of industry with a high 
proportion of immigrant workers particuarly hard. As a 
consequence unemployment grew in the immigrant community. Many 
young men, who had moved to France as workers, had to claim 
unemployment benefit; the increase in secondary immigration meant 
that their dependants also claimed social security benefits. 
Public fears and discontent, whipped up by the popular press, 
found in the immigrant community a convenient scapegoat for all 
the ills of unemployment, inflation and the developing crisis in 
funding the social security system. Economic, and equally 
important, political considerations led not only to the 
tightening up of immigration laws, but to restricting access by 
non-nationals to the social security system. In 1986 the Loi 
Pesqua introduced a new requirement for entry clearance: proof of 
adequate moyens d'existence <means of support>, the implication 
being to discourage entry of people who might have to claim 
means-tested benefits. In the U.K. such a provision has been in 
force for some time; entry clearance is given subject to the 
condition that the immigrant should have "no recourse to public 
funds" <public funds Is defined in the Immigration Rules as the 
means-tested benefits>. 
Immigrants, and as a consequence all members of ethnic minorities 
began to be depicted as scroungers, unwilling to work and content 
to live on the largesse of the social security system. In 
November 1984 the News of the World and the Daily Mail ran 
prominent stories under the headline, "£470 a week Abdul". <2> 
The implication in the headline is clearly that this man was 
receiving this sum as a cash benefit, and consequently living a 
1 ife of luKury. In fact he had been housed in a hotel at this 
cost by a Local Authority under its duty to house homeless 
persons, as there was no other accommodation available. Jean-
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Marie Le Pen's virulent and racist speeches, given wide coverage 
in the media, have done much to popularise this theme in France, 
suggesting that immigrants are a burden on the social security 
system, using up funds which should, by right, go to 'real' 
French families. 
Such racist imagery is not new- the caricature of the 'lazy 
native' is one that has subsisted since the colonial period. 
Writing two hundred years ago, for example, E.Long stated: 
Africans were brutish, ignorant, idle, crafty, treacherous, 
bloody, thievish, mistrustful and superstitious people. (3) 
In similar vein, Thomas Carlyle, writing on the problems of 
creating a competitive labour market in the West Indies, stated: 
Where a black man, by working about half an hour a day (such 
Is the calculation) can supply himself, by aid of sun and 
soil, with as much pumpkin as will suffice, he is likely to 
be a little stiff to raise into hard work. <4> 
The reasons for the resurgence of such imagery are rooted in a 
complex relationship between changed economic conditions and 
increasing tension in community relations. Such tension has 
grown out of fear and suspicion and has been expressed in terms 
of apparently 'objective' economic grievances. Immigration 
policy, initially responding to largely economic demands, has 
increasingly become a political issue. Restrictions in access to 
social security benefits can be interpreted as a response to 
political pressure, with governments feeling a need to be seen to 
be doing something about the problem. Behind the smokescreen of 
economic necessity, immigration legislation during the last ten 
years in both France and the U.K., has in fact done little more 
than make life more difficult and precarious for the settled 
minority communities in Europe, feeding rather than allaying 
racial tension. 
There is no longer any primary immigration from the Third World 
into European countries; the only groups who can apply for entry 
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are dependants, and asylum seekers and refugees. The number of 
such applications annually are minimal and can be counted In tens 
rather than hundreds of thousands. However Immigration 
legislation of the last decade has imposed draconian restrictions 
on the entry of such groups, with results that are not only 
inhumane and contravene commitments to the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, but that, because of the small numbers involved, 
make little sense in the economic terms used to justify such 
action. Equally, restrictions in access to social security 
benefits for non-nationals cannot be justified financial terms, 
but they do have the result of increasing insecurity, poverty and 
resentment. For example, in both France and the U.K. if a spouse 
or fiance of a citizen is granted entry, this is generally on the 
condition, for the initial 12 or 15 months in France, that the 
'sponsor' proves that s/he has sufficient means to support 
his/her (future> spouse, and similarly in the UK that the new 
entrant should not have 'recourse to public funds'. In order for 
a foreign spouse to be accorded settlement rights in both 
countries the couple must prove that the marriage is genuine, 
which generally implies that they have lived together for that 
initial period. Since they are effectively excluded from 
claiming social security benefits, and in France, the new entrant 
is not allowed to work, the strain on their marriage may be so 
great that they are unable to show that the marriage Is genuine! 
It appears that the intention behind recent immigration policy, 
and the resulting effect on social security entitlement, is to 
discourage immigration by the few still allowed entry, and by 
making life less secure for settled immigrants, to encourage them 
to return to their country of origin. Immigration controls in 
both France and the UK have always been concerned with 
controlling the movement of poor people. Those with significant 
financial resources have traditionally been excluded from 
restictions on immigration. This has been illustrated recently 
by the Hong Kong crisis in the UK. Public disquiet about giving 
rights of settlement to three and a half million British passport 
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holders in Hong Kong has been expressed in terms of the potential 
burden on national resources, notably those of the welfare state. 
While the government has echoed this disquiet in refusing to 
grant rights of settlement, it has been at pains to emphasise 
that people of independent means, that is with £150,000 or more 
at their disposal, will be granted admission . 
* * • • 
Research into the complex and often controversial field of access 
by ethnic minorities to social security benefits in France has so 
far been fragmentary. I have attempted to survey all existing 
published work in this field, and to gain additional information, 
where possible through a number of formal and informal channels. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Chapter 1 treats the 
question of consumption of benefits by non-nationals as a means 
of examining the reality behind the view that immigrants Ci.e. 
black people) are scroungers. Chapter 2 discusses the legal 
mechanisms by which non-nationals are restricted in their 
entitlement to benefit. Finally, Chapter 3 examines the 
practical problems experienced by ethnic minority claimants in 
gaining access to their social security entitlements, and 
discusses the methodological difficulties involved in gathering 
the necessary data. 
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INTRODUCTION - NQTES 
(1) For an overview of Immigration policy In France see: 
WITHOL DE WENDEN, Catherlne, Les Immlsres et la Polltlque, 
Presses de la Fondatlon Natlonale des Sciences Polltlques, 
1988 
(2) News of the World, 18th November 1984 and Dally Mall, 19th 
November 1984 
<3> LONG,E, History of Jamaica, 1774 
(4) CARLYLE, Thomas, cited In CORTIN, P, Imperialism, New York 
1972, p. 139 
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CHAPTER 1 - CONSUMPTION OF BENEFITS BY NON NATIONALS 
1.1 Cost-Benefit Analyses: Context and Problems 
Post-war immigration from underdeveloped countries into Western 
Europe was initially perceived as a positive and valuable 
contribution to reconstruction and economic recovery. Passengers 
aboard the liners arriving in Southampton from the West lndies in 
the 1950s were given a warm and enthusiastic welcome: Pathe 
newsreels presented the new arrivals as patriotic 'friends from 
overseas' come to join in the great 'national effort'. Between 
1950 and 1974 I.N.E.D. polls in France demonstrated an increasing 
willingness on the part of the French public to accept 
immigrants, and an acknowledgement of their economic utility. (1) 
By the late 1960s in the U.K. and the mid 1970s in France the 
mood and perceptions of the host societies had begun to change. 
With the deepening economic recession in the wake of the oil 
crisis combined with increasing racial tensions, immigration was 
no longer seen by the public as a good or even useful phenomenon. 
Popular consciousness, moulded by the mass media, saw immigrants 
as a drain on French society: taking jobs which would otherwise 
be open to French nationals, and as a burden on the French 
welfare state. <2> 
From 1976 onwards, in response to the situation a number of 
'cost-benefit' analyses have been undertaken, which attempt to 
address such questions. The style and content of the research 
has differed widely: from narrowly quantitive exercises based on 
apparently objective economic castings, to work taking a broader 
and more qualititive approach, attempting to tackle social and 
cultural issues. A major problem has been in the selection of 
indicators on which to base even the most preliminary of 
findings. These range from the effect on the balance of payments 
of the transfer of funds overseas, to more problematic questions 
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relating to the effect on French society of cultural diversity. 
Other aspects considered include the effect on patterns of 
employment, on the falling birth rate, on the provision and 
funding of the Welfare state, and the costs of additional 
provisions such as language and literecy training, specialist 
social work and housing provision. 
The oft quoted truism that statistics can be massaged to prove 
whatever one wants is especially apt in this case. Not only does 
the framework of the debate keep being shifted to include or 
exclude particular factors, but access to the necessary data is 
extremely problematic. This is partly due to the sensitivity of 
the issue which results in a reluctance on the part of official 
organisations to provide researchers with the necessary material, 
but also because since 1982 it has been illegal to keep official 
records based on ethnic origin. 
for the Commissariat de 
In a report on immigration 
Plan, published towards the end produced 
of 1988, 
policy: 
the authors comment on the consequences of such a 
L'argument de la non-discrimination- qui fonde le secret 
statistique - entre Fran~ais et etrangers, louable dans son 
principe, se retourne centre ceux qu'il tend pourtant a 
proteger, l'impossibilite de travaux scientifiques ouvrant 
le champ aux chiffrages les plus fantaisistes. <3> 
A clear example of the way in which available data can be used to 
prove opposing views is in the analysis of the effect on France's 
balance of payments of the transfer of funds abroad. The 
argument that it is a major factor contributing to a potential 
balance of payments deficit goes as follows. Economic migrants, 
often young and single, or leaving spouse and children in the 
country of origin, come to France to work, with the intention of 
sending money home to their family and relatives and/or saving 
against their return. They maintain their living expenses at a 
minimum level in order to facilitate this, and transfer a large 
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part of their earnings out of France thus increasing the balance 
of payments deficit. (4) 
The counter argument, based on very similar data, points out that 
this is over simplistic. If the money were not to be 
transferred, consumption in France would be liable to Increase 
with a consequent rise in demand for Imported goods. Thus the 
effect on the balance of payments might be equally, if not more, 
serious. As the situation stands the money transferred abroad 
usually goes to countries to which France Is a major exporter; 
thus the balance of payments is actually Improved by increased 
exports. In a government report Anicet Le Pars concludes that: 
Dans la situation economlque concrete d'aujourd'hui, les 
travailleurs immlgres contribuent en effet a la capacite 
exportatrice du pays et leurs transferts ~mes lnduisent des 
exportatlons fran~aises. (5) 
It is an argument which can never be resolved- neither of the 
hypotheses can be definitively proven or disproven. 
A further lllustration,of the way in which the 'facts' of 
immigration are open to manipulation Is In the area of 
employment. One aspect of the discussion concerns the role of 
Immigration In post-war reconstruction. The 'positive' role 
played by importing labour is 'demonstrated' by France's rapid 
modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s. Immigration provided a 
cheap and mobile labour force which, In solving the problem of a 
labour shortage, facilitated this economic progress. The 
opposing argument puts forward the view that this was a short-
sighted solution, with the consequence that cheap, unskilled 
labour has discouraged capital investment in modern equipment, 
and so stunted technological Innovation and development. 
Examples of the way in which the facts or statistics can be 
turned on their head In such ways are numerous, and serve to 
illustrate the complexity of the debate. This does not mean that 
cost-benefit analyses are irrelevant or without use. Rather, it 
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emphasises the need for caution in approaching the question, and 
illustrates the importance of avoiding snap judgements. This 
must obviously be the case in any such analysis, but here, where 
preconceptions and prejudices on both sides are numerous, such 
good practice is all the more vital. 
Perhaps the greatest value of such exercises has been to redress 
the balance in the debate and to challenge the simplistic view 
referred to at the beginning of this chapter, that immigration is 
responsible for both unemployment and the crisis in the French 
welfare state. 
The aim of thls chapter is to examine in detail one aspect of the 
debate, that ls to assess the effect of immigration on the social 
security system by looking at the pattern of consumption of 
welfare benefits by immigrants. 
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1.2 Immigration and social security 
The crisis in the social security system has Injected a 
particularly topical note Into the debate. The Image of the 
'lazy native' of a former era has become the social security 
scrounger of today, a convenient scapegoat for problems whose 
real causes are far less easy to Identify. That this theme 
should be exploited by the 'Front National' Is not surprising. 
The following extract from a speech made by Jean-Mar!e Le Pen In 
the run up to the legislative elections In 1988 illustrates the 
point: 
Les jeunes couples fran~a!s n'ont pas assez d'enfants 
parce-qu'ils n'ont pas Jes Jogements soclaux qu'!l faut. 
!Is n'auront jama!s de HLM car 11 y aura toujours une 
famllle senegala!se de sept, hu!t ou neuf enfants pour 
passer devant eux. (6) 
However it is not only the extreme right who propound such views, 
the traditional right also make use of the same Ideas. For 
example In February 1985 the 'Club 89', founded by M!chel 
Aurillac - later a minister In Chlrac's government - produced a 
work entitled 'Une Strateg!e de Gouvernement'. In the third 
chapter, 'Ma!trlser l'Immlgrat!on', there are assertions to the 
effect that Immigrants benefit disproportionately from social 
security payments, especially from family benefits because of the 
greater number of children In most Immigrant families. There Is 
the clear implication that this Is at the expense of native 
French families. The conclusions of this publication were, it 
appears, accepted by Ch!rac, Barre and Glscard d'Estalng- the 
principal leaders of the French right and centre-right. (7) 
Before examining the available research In this field I propose 
to outline briefly the nature of the crisis In the French social 
security system. It Is rooted In three particular demographic 
and social factors: the ageing population combined with a lower 
birthrate; the rise In long term unemployment, and the greater 
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consumption and escalating costs of health care. A fourth factor 
worthy of consideration is that the whole system is unwieldy, 
made up of a large number of both private and public 
organisations, a headline in Le Monde sums it up as "Une mosal'que 
de caisses et de regimes'. The same article goes on: 
La complexite du systeme fran~ais, constitue de multiples 
regimes a base plus ou moins relies entre eux et differents 
par leur financement comme par leurs prestations, en fait un 
casse-tete meme pour Jes specialistes. <8> 
This has the consequence that central planning and government 
social policy initiatives are difficult to implement. 
The cost of providing health care has, in recent decades risen 
dramatically. Not only has demand risen with improved health 
education, but so has the actual price of treatment with the 
development of ever more sophisticated medical technology. An 
additional strain on the provision of health care is the increase 
in the proportion of elderly people in France's population, who 
along with babies under a year old, are the greatest consumers of 
medical treatment. <9> 
The improvements in health care combined with a better standard 
of Jiving are major factors in contributing to the increase in 
the numbers of old people in France. Since 1970 average life 
expectancy has increased by 2.9 years for men, and by 3.7 years 
for women. This factor combined with the lowering of the 
retirement age - the number of men working between the age of 60 
and 64 halved between 1971 and 1983, and the number of women of 
the same age has fallen by a third in the same period <10> - has 
put an enormous strain on pension schemes. As the proportion of 
contributors to pensioners drops, the pension schemes are 
struggling unsuccessfully to balance their books: predictions for 
1988 show the main pension organisation with a higher deficit 
(19.23 billion <US> Francs) than any other part of the social 
security system. <Ill 
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An additional cause of the drop in the proportion of contributors 
to those on benefit throughout the social security system is the 
rise in unemployment, especially long term unemployment. This 
has itself given rise to other problems, in that there are large 
numbers of people who have paid insufficient contributions to 
claim unemployment benefit or whose benefit, which is time-
limited has run out- 40.7% of the total number unemployed were 
not entitled to any unemployment benefit in December 1987. <12> 
If they do not have children they are left with no source of 
income that they have a right to. The French parliament has 
recently passed legislation which will ultimately introduce a 
guaranteed minimum income for everyone, but the indications are 
that it will be some time before this is fully implemented. 
The causes of the problems in the French social security system 
are for the most part common to the majority of countries in the 
developed world, who have experienced similar, although not 
always such pronounced, demographic and social developments. 
There is however a significant difference in the way that the 
discussion is framed in France, as compared to, for example, the 
UK. A selection of headlines from Le Monde illustrate the form 
that the debate takes: "Depenses en hausse. . . . et recet tes en 
bat sse'', "De 1 'exceden t au deft ci t" and "Les comptes annee par 
annee''. <13) The crisis is expressed in terms of a budget 
deficit, with the social security system running on an overdraft. 
The reasons for these perceptions are rooted in the underlying 
principles of the French welfare state. As in many other 
countries it developed after the war, based on a system of state 
insurance. People in work pay a proportion of their earnings to 
cover the main risks of unemployment, sickness, old age and 
industrial injury. Employers pay an additional contribution per 
employee also based on a percentage of the gross wages. In 
addition they fund the majority of the programme of family 
benefits paid at the rate of 9% of each employees earnings. The 
percentages are subject to an upper earnings limit, as such the 
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system is fundamentally one of horizontal rather than vertical 
redistribution, with the lower paid bearing a disproportionately 
higher burden. Entitlement to benefit is based principally on 
satisfying the relevant contribution conditions. There are a 
number of state administered benefits funded by taxation in the 
name of solidarite nationale, but compared to, for example the 
UK, this makes up only a small proportion of overall spending. 
In the U.K. National Insurance benefits are, as in France, paid 
out of an identifiable fund with entitlement dependant on meeting 
the relevant contribution conditions. However, unlike France, 
the low level at which such benefits are paid has had the effect 
that the National Insurance budget has been in credit for many 
years. It is the income related (means-tested) benefits that 
have become the central part of the British social security 
system. Entitlement to these benefits is based on criteria of 
need, not contributions: as such the increase in spending on 
health and social security in Britain does not lend itself to 
being expressed in terms of a budget deficit. 
There is a view that the social security budget is a finite fund, 
which may be exhausted by overconsumption by any one section of 
society. This attitude is based on a misconception of what a 
system of state insurance actually represents: it is only finite, 
and therefore possible to exhaust, if a political decision is 
taken not to raise contribution levels, or to supplement the fund 
from general taxation to meet demand. It is In fact a form of 
taxation, intended to be redistributive, the contribution levels 
can be adjusted in the same way as income tax rates and 
allowances. Since the language of a state insurance system is so 
similar to that of private insurance schemes, it is 
understandable that there should be an obsession with the view 
that some people, and immigrants in particular, are getting out 
more than they paid in. This might be a legitimate view in for 
example, a private pension plan, where the pension realised would 
be entirely dependant on the money paid in and invested. However 
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in a state insurance scheme is intended not to give a return on 
investment, but to be red!str!but!ve, it Is not a tenable view. 
The authors of the report to the Comm!sar!at de Plan, cited 
above, point out that: 
Dans un systeme de protection sociale comb!nant 
trad!tionellement les principes d'assurance, de repartition 
et de solidarite, presenter un b!lan financier relat!f a une 
population specifique peut sembler une demarche discutable; 
n'est-il pas tout aussi artificial de pretendre batir un 
bilan de la protection sociale des immigres que ce le serait 
pour n'importe quelle autre categorie sociale choisie en 
fonction de son age, de son revenu, de son sexe, de son lieu 
de residence ou de son secteur d'activite? <14> 
- 18-
1.3 Family Benefits - 'overconsumpt!on' by Immigrants? 
In analysing the available data on Immigration and consumption of 
benefits, I will concentrate on three main areas: family 
benefits; health care, and Industrial injury payments. The 
reasons for this are firstly that these areas are the most 
contentious- rumours and wild assumptions abound; and secondly 
because, for reasons not unconnected with the first point, there 
is significantly more data available. 
Family benefits in France are administered by the Caisses 
d'Allocations Familiales <CAFs>. The bulk of the expenditure 
goes on Allocations Familiales <AF- the approximate equivalent 
of Child Benefit in the United Kingdom, but only payable for 
second and subsequent children>. There are then a range of 
specific benefits, mainly means-tested, designed to help families 
on a low income with, for example, housing costs or to meet the 
needs of lone parents. 
Recent research by the CAF, based on a sample survey of 2% of 
claimants, indicates that non-French, and especially non-EEC 
families receive a disproportionate share of family benefits. At 
31st December 1985, of the 4 million families claiming family 
benefits, 88.7% were French, and 3.8% nationals of a non EEC 
country. However of the proportion of total benefits paid out 
84.5% went to French families and 9.5% to non-EEC nationals. <15> 
A study carried out In the mid 1970s in Grenoble, which compared 
the number of contributors to the number of claimants of 
benefits, established that the proportion of French claimants was 
lower than that of contributors (74.9% against 83.75%), For non-
nationals the opposite was true- 25.04% of claimants against 
16.25% of contributors. (16> A study carried out by ENA students 
in 1984 came up with comparable results: the proportion of family 
benefits received by non-nationals was 14.4% of the total, 
whereas their share of the contributions was only 7. 9%. <17> 
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On the face of it therefore, foreign families, and especially 
those from outside the EEC, receive a disproportionate share of 
family benefits, and are a considerable financial burden on the 
system. However such a statement is both simplistic and 
misleading. The question arises as to what this share is 
disproportionate to. Clearly it Is disproportionate to their 
contributions, however in a system designed to meet certain 
social policy objectives, involving, for eKample, redistribution 
from rich to poor and from those In work to those unable to work, 
such an approach is hardly appropriate. A more relevant and 
productive approach is surely to analyse whether the consumption 
of benefits by non-nationals Is disproportionate to their needs, 
as defined by the system Itself. 
One of the major reasons for the •overconsumption' can be 
eKpla!ned with reference to the sort of criteria upon which 
payment of family benefits depend. The size of the family, the 
age of the children, and - for the means-tested benefits- the 
level of income are the principal factors in determining the 
requirements of families and therefore the level of benefit 
payable. 
The higher birth rate among non-EEC families - 33% have four or 
more children, as compared to only 6.6% of French families- when 
combined with the level of Income Is clearly the most significant 
factor. Figures based on declarations de ressources (statements 
of income, completed by claimants of means-tested benefits) 
received by the CAF, show that 48.2% of French families earned 
over 90,000F in 1985, as compared to only 13.5% of non-EEC 
nationals. At the other end of the scale only 11% of French 
families had an income below 50,000F, whereas the proportion of 
non-EEC fam! lies was 37. 2%. (18) Since these figures are based 
only on those who filled In forms to claim means-tested benefits, 
the true difference may be considerably higher as only the poorer 
sections of society will claim means-tested benefits. 
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When these two factors are combined, lt Is clear that the greater 
the number of children, the lower the Income Is likely to be. 
Although this Is true for both French and non-EEC families, there 
Is a much greater proportion of large non-EEC families on a very 
low Income: of those with four or more children approximately 
three-quarters have an Income below 70,000F, but this Is true for 
only about half of the French families of a similar size. (19) 
One of the most likely causes of this Is that the number of women 
who work, and therefore contribute a second Income, is much lower 
In non-EEC families, due to a combination of cultural and social 
factors- for example the acceptability of women working, and the 
lower level of skills and/or qualifications. In families with 
two children two-thirds of French women go out to work, end only 
407. of non-EEC women; In families with four or more children the 
proportions are a quarter to 12.37. respectively. (20> 
When these two factors alone <size of family and level of Income) 
are fed in to the comparison, and like Is compared with like, 
then, logically enough, the disparity virtually disappears. 
There remain, however a few areas where a disparity remains, and 
other factors need to be considered. One such area concerns 
families with two children where there remains a disparity of 
between 107. and 207. in favour of non-EEC families. This can 
probably be explained with reference to the age of the children: 
non-EEC families of this size often contain very young children 
since the family Is still In the process of growing. They are 
therefore more likely to qualify for a special benefit-
Allocation eu Jeune Enfant <AJE>. (21) 
There Is one particular area of benefits which shows a markedly 
higher level of consumption by families from outside the EEC -
those for single parents. There are two benefits available: 
Allocation de Parent !sole <APil which is means-tested, and 
Allocation de Soutien Familial <ASF>, which is not, and is 
designed to minimise the loss of income where no maintenance is 
being paid. The proportion of non-EEC lone parent families in 
-21-
receipt of API is 23% compared to 15% of French families. This 
is clearly attributable to the lower earning power of non-EEC 
women, and to the higher average number of children. The 
disparity in payments of ASF <57% of non-EEC single parent 
families as opposed to under half French families) is probably 
the result of a lower divorce rate among non-EEC couples, 
particuarly those In the Muslim community. In these 
circumstances, therefore, there is less likelihood of a proper 
maintenance arrangement through the courts. <22> 
The scheme to help families and some other people on a low Income 
with their housing costs Is also administered by the CAFs. There 
are two sorts of benefit available. The difference stems from a 
policy decision to encourage landlords to improve their rented 
housing stock. As such, tenants of accommodation built after 
1977, or Improved to specified standards receive a different, and 
in some cases, a higher level of, benefit <Aide Personnalise au 
LoBement - APL> than do those in older, unimproved accommodation 
<Allocation de LoBement Familial - ALF>. When the figures are 
examined, with adjustments made for the fact that housing costs, 
and therefore the maximum allowable rent, are higher in Paris and 
other major conurbations where the majority of the immigrant 
community is concentrated, roughly the same proportion of French 
and foreign families receive some sort of help with housing 
costs. However, as Antoine Chastand of CNAF points out: 
Si les Fran9ais se repartissent globalement moitle-moitle 
entre ALF et APL ..... les etrangers beneflclent masslvement 
de l'ALF au detriment de l'APL. De plus l'alde qu'lls 
per~oivent, ALF et APL confondues est toujours legerement 
moindre, toutes chases egales par ailleurs. (23) 
If non-EEC citizens claimed the two benefits In the same 
proportions as do French people, then the amount received would 
be between 15% and 20% higher, mainly because the accommodation 
covered by APL Is generally more expensive. The consequence Is 
therefore that non-EEC families, as a result of the lower 
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standard of housing to which they have access, are effectively 
discriminated against by the benefit system. 
In a social security system Intended, at least to some extent, to 
redistribute Income In favour of those In greatest need, lt Is 
hardly surprising that the poorest members of society, and those 
with highest child care costs, should benefit more than the 
average. As Guy Herzlich commented: 
On aurait sans doute obtenu des resultats molns contrastes, 
mais comparables en examinant la situation des familles 
ouvrieres, leur fecondite etant aussi superieure a la 
moyenne. <24> 
The fact that non-EEC families receive a greater share of family 
benefits than do French families as a whole does not establish 
that they are actually receiving either all they need, or all 
that they are entitled to. In fact there is persuasive evidence 
to the contrary, which suggests that despite the apparent 
'overconsumption', the CAF is actually making a net profit from 
immigration, due to the condition of residence required to claim 
most family benefits. 
The CAF study cited above, looked only at non-EEC families as a 
proportion of all claimants resident in France. If, as in the 
Grenoble study of the mid 1970s, one combines the total number of 
claimants both in France and abroad, then a somewhat different 
picture emerges. Although the figures quoted earlier from this 
study showed that the ratio of non-EEC contributors to 
beneficiaries is lower than that of French contributors to 
beneficiaries, this does not reflect the level of payment 
received. This is because only one benefit- AF- is payable 
overseas, and it Is paid at a significantly lower rate than In 
France. In 1972 the average monthly payment of AF per child 
resident in France was higher for non-EEC children (106.90F as 
compared to 89.72F>. This was principally due to the social and 
demographic factors outlined above. However when the figures for 
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those children on whose behalf AF was being paid abroad were 
added in, then the balance swung the other way for Portugese, 
Tunisian and Algerian nationals the figure was 73.34F per child 
as compared to the 89.72F for French children. <25) 
The authors of the Grenoble study, Cordeiro and Verhaeren, then 
explored the consequences likely to arise if the families of of 
immigrant workers, left the country of origin to take up 
residence in France. Since entitlement to the full range of 
benefits is strictly dependant on residence in France, they would 
then be entitled, not only to AF paid at a higher rate, but also 
to the other benefits. 
Based on figures from the CAF in lsere, Cordeiro and Verhaeren 
calculated the likely additional costs which would be incurred as 
a consequence. The complicated calculation took into account 
factors such as: the average number of children per family by 
nationality; the distribution of age, since this affects the 
level of benefit payable, and the probable number of families 
with only one child receiving AF, who would not qualify in 
France. The study arrived at two possible figures: the first 
based on the official numbers of claimants, where the estimated 
additional cost to CAF would have been 1.358 billion <US> Francs; 
1.129 billion <USl for North-West Africans alone. The second 
figure was based on results of other research which had strongly 
suggested that, due to a range of administrative problems, a 
significant number of families abroad were not receiving benefit 
to which they were enti tied. In this case the total annual 
'saving' was estimated at 1.824 billion Francs, with 1.517 
accounted for by North-West Africans. The actual payment of AF 
abroad was only 15.08% or 11.68% respectively of the total 
payable if these families lived in France. <26> 
The authors point out that there would be no problem for CAF in 
finding this additional sum, since at 15th March 1972 the 
organisation had a surplus of 7.103 billion <US> Francs. <27l 
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In 1987 the surplus was actually only in the order of 0.17 
billion <US> <28>, but the fact remains that if it were not for 
the savings made on the basis of the contributions of non-EEC 
workers with families in the country of origin, then there would 
be an enormous deficit- or contribution levels would have to be 
raised. The contribution to Fonds d'Actfon Soctale <FAS- an 
organisation which provides certain specialised social services 
and housing fa the minority communities> is made in 
acknowledgement of this 'profit'. However in 1972 it was 98.112 
million Francs <29), a tiny proportion of the estimated savings. 
The supposed reciprocity through bi-lateral social security 
agreements is generally argued to be another factor in lessening 
this 'profit'. However, this is an unrealistic view because it 
takes no account of the actual flow of migrant labour, 
comparitively few French people go to work in North-West Africa 
and those that do are generally part of company organised welfare 
schemes based in France. 
The authors of the Grenoble study conclude: 
Au niveau des allocations vers~es hors-metropole, il existe 
une distortion considerable dans la redistribution des 
revenus en fonction de la charge familiale. Alors que les 
allocataires etrangers sans famille en France cotisent dans 
les m~mes conditions que tous les autres, le niveau de leurs 
prestations familiales est derisoire. <30) 
This probably remains substantially true today, because although 
there has been increased family re-unification, there remain 
significant numbers of single immigrant workers, partly as a 
result of the strict conditions imposed on those workers who wish 
to bring in dependants. 
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1.4 Health care benefits 
The question of health care costs is an especially contentious 
one: there is a widespread view that North-West Africans make 
unreasonably heavy use of hospitals, in particular, putting an 
already stretched health service, under further strain. This 
argument has even less of a basis in solid fact than that 
concerning family benefits. 
According to a report produced by a group of students at the 
Ecole Nationale d'Admlnlstratlon <ENA> non-nationals were 
responsible for 7.6% of contributions for health insurance, and 
for only 6.3% of the eKpenditure. (31) An INSEE-CREDOC survey 
in 1980 showed that health expenditure on the minority group held 
most responsible for overuse of health care facilities, the 
North-West Africans, represented only half of that for Portugese, 
Italians and Spanish immigrants, and as little as a third of that 
for French nationals. <32> It is clear therefore that non-EEC 
nationals are far from constituting a disproportionate burden on 
the health service. 
There are however significant differences in the pattern of 
consumption, especially between North-West Africans and French 
people. Visits to a G.P. are far less frequent for the former 
group, an average of 3.14 visits per annum, as compared to 5.29 
for French patients. <33> The frequency of hospital attendance 
Is however higher for North-West Africans, 54% as against 48%. 
Here there would appear to be an element of truth to the public 
perceptions noted above. (34) Yet despite the higher level of 
attendance, the actual average cost remains lower, 2130F to 2367F 
<35> for three principal reasons. Firstly, there is some use of 
French hospital treatment by non-residents who are liable to pay 
the full costs. Secondly there is a high incidence of industrial 
injuries among immigrant workers, in which case the cost is met 
by the employers. Thirdly, the reasons for admission of North-
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West Africans are often significantly different from those of 
French people, and may not require the use of expensive medical 
technology. 
It is both interesting and relevant to a discussion of costs or 
benefits of immigration to provision of health care, to examine 
the reasons for the differences in the pattern of consumption 
outlined above. One of the most Important reasons for the 
overall lower level of consumption is due to the 'high quality' 
in health terms, of Immigrant workers who come to France. Before 
being given leave to enter France they have to undergo a thorough 
medical examination, which sifts out not only those with serious 
diseases, but all those who are not fully fit. Nearly a quarter 
of all Algerian candidates for immigration into France In the 
early 1970s were rejected due to an "!nsuffisance staturo-
ponderale". (36) In addition there Is a process of self-
selection which reinforces the medical controls: it is really 
only the youngest and fittest who have the initiative and courage 
to take on the challenge of emigrating for work. 
The demographic characteristics of the immigrant population are 
another significant factor in their lower expenditure on health 
care. Despite the Increased level of family re-unification 
single young and middle-aged men are still in a sizeable majority 
in this population. Statistics show that men aged between 17 and 
39, with the exception of Industrial Injuries, are the lowest 
consumers of health care among the population as a whole. <37> 
It is babies, young children and the elderly who account for the 
highest expenditure. The over 60s who represent 19% of the 
French population account for 43% of total health care costs; in 
1984 only 10% of the foreign population in France was over 60, 
(38> a considerable number having returned to their country of 
origin at retirement. 
Children under 10 represent a greater proportion of the foreign 
population than of the French: 17t as compared to 13%. <39) Yet 
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expenditure on health care for children among the foreign 
population is a third less per child than for French children. 
(40) This can be explained by reference to social and cultural, 
rather than demographic factors. Patterns of health care 
consumption in the developed world are very different from those 
in the Third World where hospitals and public dispensaries are 
often the only available source of primary health care. 
Generally, medical help and expertise are sought only to deal 
with immediate problems of i 1 Lnese or injury 1 r"'ther th;m as part 
of a programme of preventitive health care involving for example, 
regular check-ups and vaccinations for young children. 
Immigrants coming into France naturally bring with them 
expectations and habits from their country of origin. This 
factor certainly helps to explain both the greater use of 
hospitals by the North-West African community, and the Lower cost 
of medicaL care for their chiLdren. 
Pierre Mormiche of INSEE has noted: 
Les lmm!gres maghrebins constituent un cas extr~me de 
'distance cul turelle' au med!c!n. (41) 
It is at the age of forty that French <and Indeed western> men 
start to make much heavier use of medical facilities, reflecting 
both the fear and the reaLity of stress related diseases at this 
age. For North-West African men of this age, this Is not at all 
the case, possibly due In part to differences In diet and 
lifestyle. As Pierre Morm!che comments: 
La population !mmigree d'Afrique du Nord la plus &gee est 
plus eloignee culturellement de La pratique medicate 
occ!dentale que ne le sent les jeunes. (42> 
He suggests that this may also be true of North-West African 
women, who play a part!cuarly Important role in shaping the 
attitudes of the next generation. 
Whilst there is a grain of truth in the view that non-EEC 
nationals, and In particular Maghreblns make greater use of 
hospitals than do the French population, the significance of such 
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a factor has been crudely distorted. When the actual cost of 
treatment, both specifically in hospitals and for health care in 
general, is examined, it is clear that there is in fact dramatic 
'underconsumption' by this section of the community. The reasons 
for this are a combination of demographic factors and cultural 
attitudes to Western medical practice. 
In a related area, that of industrial injuries payments <both the 
resulting medical needs and the subsequent invalidity pensions) 
we find that foreign workers account for approximately 20~ of 
industrial injuries payments, but constitute only 6% of the 
workforce. (43> There is not, on the whole, much controversy 
about funding here, since the charges are borne by the employers, 
in different proportions, depending on the risk factor of the 
sort of work, and on the company's previous safety record. Since 
the vast majority of immigran~are concentrated in those sectors 
of the economy where the risk of industrial injury is highest -
engineering, building work etc- it is not surprising that the 
statistics should be as they are. 
It is, however, a matter of concern that there is some evidence 
to suggest an 'underconsumption' of both necessary medical 
treatment and of invalidity pensions. It appears that many 
immigrant workers lose out to a marked degree, mainly due to 
excessive administrative processes and related problems of 
language and literacy. After a serious accident many immigrant 
workers return to their country of origin to convalesce. Whilst, 
in theory, their entitlement should not be affected, it is not 
uncommon for claims to be lost due to the long, drawn out and 
complicated procedure to establish the degree of incapacity upon 
which the pension is based, a process which takes place in 
France. Even if there is not the problem of prolonged absence 
from France, the whole process requires such a high level of 
language skills and confidence in the face of bureaucracy, that 
many immigrant workers fail to argue their case convincingly, or 
lack the confidence to challenge ini t tal decisions. (44) 
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In addition, if the injury is such that the worker is no longer 
capable of doing his/her job, not only does the invalidity 
pension often fail to compensate for the loss of earnings, even 
in the best of situations, but any benefit <AF> payable to the 
family in the country of origin will cease if he has returned 
there and is unable to work. A further point to note is that 
there is a mass of anecdotal evidence to suggest that a 
significant number of employers fail to notify industrial 
injuries, in pert because of the effect on their safety record 
and the consequent penalties imposed. It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that this occurs more frequently in the case of immigrant 
workers among whom lack of language skills ,ignorance of their 
rights, end insecure employment all contribute to increase the 
probability of such occurences. 
It is therefore appropriate to argue that in the field of 
industrial injuries, not only ere immigrant workers not a 
disproportionate burden on the system, but due to the probable 
loss of entitlement they ere in effect subsidising the cost of 
the system to employers. 
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1.5 Conclusion- The nature of the debate 
The view that the immigrant population is a drain on a hard 
pushed social security budget is clearly a myth. Even where 
apparently there is 'overconsumption' as in the case of family 
benefits, it is evident that this is quite simply due to social 
and demographic factors. When like is compared with like, then 
the disparity all but disappears. Furthermore it can indeed be 
argued that the contributions of Immigrant workers have, for many 
years, cushioned the French social system from a much higher 
deficit than now exists. 
The crisis in the main pension scheme is a case in point. 
Immigrant workers are responsible for 8.3~ of the contributions 
and only 5.03~ of the expenditure. (45) This is caused 
principally by the fact that those who return to their country of 
origin upon retirement may lose entitlement, or discover that 
their contributions are insufficient to qualify for a reasonable 
pension. In addition, once returned to the country of origin, 
they are unable to benefit from the 'top up' provided for people 
resident in France who qualify for little or no pension. 
A related factor In the field of pension-funding Is the higher 
birth-rate of the non-EEC population In France. An issue that 
has been the subject of so much reproach In the media is likely 
to prove an important bonus In future funding of pensions. The 
proportion of those in work to those drawing a pension has fallen 
in recent decades, due in part to the falling French birth-rate; 
the higher birth-rate in the population of immigrant origin will 
offset this. 
Another factor in the argument that France has made a net profit 
from Immigration Is related to the concept of the profile of 'le 
travallleur national'. It Is assumed that there Is a standard 
pattern throughout someone's life of times when they will be on 
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the receiving end of social security benefits <that is during 
childhood, old age and sickness) and times when they will be 
contributing (that is, when in work). This profile is used to 
forecast social security provision. The profile of the immigrant 
worker is rather different: the country of origin will have borne 
the costs of educating and providing health care and child 
support for the worker. If, as often happens s/he returns home 
at retirement, even assuming that a pension is payable, it will 
be the country of origin which bears all the additional costs of 
medical and social care in old age. Based on figures from 1960-
1965, at a time when the 'rotation' system was still dominant, 
Alfred Sauvy calculated the saving as representing twenty-five 
times that paid out under bi-lateral agreements. <46> This 
includes the fact that the principal cost of raising children of 
immigrant workers who have remained in the country of origin, 
will not be borne by France. With the increase in family re-
unification through the 1970s a similar calculation would not now 
produce such dramatic results. There are, however, a sizeable 
number of families who have, either through choice, or through 
force of circumstances remained in the country of origin, whom 
the immigrant worker will only rejoin permanently upon 
retirement. As such France continues to make considerable 
'savings' in social security expenditure. 
With the perceived crisis in the social security system the 
analysis of immigration and social security expressed in terms of 
profit and loss has been equated with a notion of a finite fund, 
diminishing at a rapid rate, In part because of the immigrant 
population. This Is based on a particularly narrow understanding 
of the workings of the social security system, and of the nature 
of the crisis. 
A system of state insurance bears no relation to for example, a 
private pension scheme, where contributions paid, by being 
invested In a growing fund, have a direct bearing on the amount 
of pension realised. In a system of state insurance social 
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security benefits are paid out of current contributions; the 
contribution conditions which must be satisfied for a successful 
claim, serve no purpose other than to control the number of 
claimants. Indeed the rate at which contributions are paid, and 
the level at which benefits are set are determined on political 
not actuarial grounds. It is therefore a particularly selective 
means of taxation to fund a system to meet identified needs. As 
such it is intended to be redistributive: from those in work to 
those without work; from young to old, and from childless to 
those on a low income with high child care costs. It is an 
absolute nonsense to single out any group who are particuarly 
poor, and have higher child care costs, and blame them for the 
apparent deficit. In fact all that the existence of a deficit 
proves is that the proportion of people in work to those out of 
work has changed, and that the means of financing needs to be 
examined and perhaps adjusted. 
The immigrant population qualfies for many income maintenance 
benefits because of its poverty. It was precisely this povety 
that made immigration such an attractive proposition in French 
eyes after the war. Immigrant workers from Third World countries 
were willing to accept lower wages, and possibly a lower standard 
of working conditions than their French counterparts. These were 
great advantages for a capitalist economy which is able to derive 
many benefits from such flexibility and mobility of labour. By 
encouraging immigration especially from North-West Africa the 
French authorities brought in a sector of the population which 
would, by definition, be eligible for more than the average 
amount of benefit. 
None of the authors of the various 'cost-benefit' analyses-
whether their works cover a wide spectrum or are limited to a 
narrow range of criteria move far beyond the crude notion of 
profit versus loss. In any comparable study which singled out a 
particular part of the French population, for example the elderly 
or pre-school children, the emphasis would be on questions about 
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the appropriateness of current provision, and contain 
recommendations for future policy to meet the identified needs 
better. This provides something of a clue as to what the 
underlying premise of all such exercises really is. The 
fundamental question behind all studies, of the left or right, 
sympathetic to the needs of the immigrant community or not, is 
whether immigration is a good or a bad thing. It is a question 
of political importance, hiding behind the smokescreen of the 
apparently neutral language of economists and statisticians. As 
Abdelmalek Sayad points out: 
Rationaliser dens le langage de l'economie un probleme qui 
n'est pas (ou pas seulement) economique mais politique, 
revient a convertir en arguments purements techniques des 
arguments ethiques et politiques. (47) 
Even the most sympathetic authors have been drawn into the debate 
on these terms. Even if their conclusion is that France has made 
a net profit out of immigration and that it can therefore be seen 
as a 'good thing' on the whole, they seem to accept that it is a 
legitimate question to ask. Yet the population of immigrant 
origin is now largely settled in France. It is therefore 
politically mischevious to suggest that cost-benefit analyses of 
this kind can validly discuss members of French society, 
especially those who have known no other home, in terms of 
whether or not they are an asset to France. Conducting the 
debate in these terms seems to carry the implicit rider that if 
immigration is a bad thing then the immigrant community should be 
dispatched elsewhere. Given that for none of the mainstream 
political parties is large scale repatriation a serious option, 
the only reason that they have encouraged and taken part in this 
debate must relate to political expediency: politicians wish to 
be seen to be 'doing something' about immigration. Such an 
attitude is both short-sighted and irresponsible: it has the 
consequence of lending credibility to the perspectives of the far 
right, with potentially damaging effects on race relations in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER 2 - EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW? 
2.1 Introduction 
French social security and social assistance law is based on 
principles which are generally thought to exclude any 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. Elle Alfandrl, a 
leading authority on this subject, states: 
Le droit de la protection soclale, compte tenu du fondement 
et des flnalites de celle-cl, postule ..... l'egalite des 
beneficiaires, lndependemment de leur national! te. (1) 
It is this widely accepted view that this chapter aims to examine 
centrally. To do so we need to consider first of all the 
conditions of entitlement to benefit, and the principles which 
underpin French social policy legislation. It will be seen that 
these do indeed appear to be non-discriminatory. 
2.2 Guiding Principles 
The French system of welfare benefits is divided Into two main 
parts, covered by separate legislation: slicuritli sociale ("social 
security"> and aide sociale <"social assistance"). The former is 
based on the concept of social insurance. Regulated by the 
state, the system is administered by Caisses (semi-autonomous 
insurance companies). Contributions are paid, generally by those 
in employment, to cover the risks of illness, injury and 
unemployment for themselves and their dependants. The main 
criterion upon which payment of benefits is based is therefore an 
appropriate contribution record. The other basic criterion is 
one of residence in France. Family benefits operate in a 
slightly different way. They are entirely funded by the 
employers, and therefore their payment is not linked to an 
Individual contribution record. It can be argued that the 
employers' contributions represent an Indirect deduction from 
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wages. Payment of family benefits was, before 1978, subject to 
being in employment, although with some exceptions. Since that 
date the conditions of entitlement have been relaxed to include 
all families resident in France. 
The provision of aide sociale complements and makes up for some 
of the gaps left by the social security system. It is a 
decentralised system,funded by taxation and administered by local 
authorities. The benefits payable fall into two main categories: 
aide sociale legale, which is based on entitlement, and aide 
sociale facultatiG a range of discretionary benefits which, to 
some extent, vary depending on local need. The basic conditions 
of entitlement are that of residence and that of need- the 
benefits are means tested. 
Finally there are a few other non-contributory benefits directly 
funded by the state, through the Fonds National de Solidarite, 
mainly for elderly and handicapped claimants. They are 
administered by appropriate local organisations, either local 
authorities or Caisses d'Allocations Familiales <CAFs- the 
organisations which administer the payment of family benefits 
locally>. The basic conditions of entitlement are the same as 
those for aide sociale. 
Such a system does not appear to Jay itself open to the charge of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Social security 
Jaw cannot distinguish between the contributions paid by 
immigrants and nationals, and there can therefore be no 
difference in the payments. As Alfandri comments: "Comment 
concevoir une discrimination pour des prestations fondees sur des 
cotisations?" (2) Equally the criterion of need for eide 
sociale, either financial or related to a specific situation, for 
example disability, does not make a distinction between the 
nationality of claimants. 'Need', although open to a wide 
variety of interpretations is held to be objective inasmuch as 
whatever definition is used, it cannot alter with nationality. 
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One of the most fundamental proofs of the neutrality of the 
French welfare benefits system is often said to lie in the fact 
that entitlement is conditional upon residence, rather than 
nationality, where both Bide sociale and securite sociBle are 
concerned. Residence is interpreted so broadly that virtually 
any non-national living in France is entitled to the same 
benefits as a French person. Article 124 of the Code de la 
Famille et de l'Aide Sociale <CFAS - the body of legislation 
which governs Bide sociBle> states: 
Toute personne residant en France beneficia , si elle 
remplit les conditions legales d'attribution, des formes de 
!'aide socia!e telles qu'elles sont definies par le present 
code. 
On the face of it the concept of residence for Bide socialeis 
restricted neither to a tight legal definition involving, for 
example, proper immigration status, nor to a consideration of 
length or stability. 
The Code de la Securite Sociale <CSS - the body of legislation 
covering securite socialel requires simply that the residence 
should be in metropolitan France. Article L311-7 of the CSS 
states: 
Les travailleurs etrangers et leurs ayants-droit beneficient 
des prestations d'assurances sociales s'ils ant leur 
residence en France. 
In principle there is no requirement for proof of satisfactory 
immigration status, although Alfandri notes, in passing that 
family benefits are an exception to this rule. 
Alfandri concedes that since a number of non-contributory 
benefits are funded by the state In the name of solidarite 
nationale, it would be conceivable for non-nationals to be 
excluded from some of these advantages. Equally, the degree of 
autonomy given to local authorities to respond to the needs of 
their area might also lead to discrimination. There is also the 
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Issue that rights to social protection may, In certain 
circumstances, be limited by considerations of national security. 
However Alfandri argues that there are a number of checks built 
into the French legal system which restrict the possibility of 
any such discrimination. The preembule to the 1946 constitution 
ties the hand of any legislator wishing to introduce 
discriminatory clauses, when it states that: 
La nation garantit a tous la protection de la sante, la 
securlte materielle, le repos et les loisirs 
and it acknowledges 
le droit d'obtenlr de la collectivite des moyens convenables 
d'existence pour tout @tre humain qui, en raison de son age, 
de son etat physique ou mental et de la situation 
economique, se trouve hors d'etat de travailler. 
<My emphases) 
That this represents more than well meaning statements of intent 
is confirmed by a recent decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
(23/1/87). It re-affirmed that the spirit of such principles in 
the preambule could not be contravened by any legislation. 
To demonstrate the efficacy of such checks in limiting the 
possibility of discrimination, commentators point to a decision 
taken by the Tribunal administratif de Paris in March 1986 in 
response to a case brought against Paris City Council by M.R.A.P. 
<Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amttte entre les Peuples). 
Paris City Council had introduced a local benefit, Conge parental 
d'education, and restricted payment to French families only. 
This benefit was intended to support the income of large 
families, where, on the birth of a third child the mother decided 
to stay at home to look after the family. A monthly sum of 
between 1,700 and 2,000FF was payable in 1984. The Tribunal found 
that such a decision could not be justified; that there was no 
basis for discrimination either on the grounds of individual 
circumstances differing with nationality, nor In the Interests of 
the effective targettlng of local services to the community. 
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Many of the contributors to a special edition of the Revue de 
Droit Sanitaire et Social (3) point out that further checks on 
discrimination are to be found In International law, for example, 
the Geneva Convention on refugees of 1951; the European Social 
Charter; I.L.O. agreements on social security and social 
assistance, and the various bi-lateral agreements on social 
protection between France and certain other countries. 
There Is only a very limited possibility that security 
considerations could In any way limit benefit rights, Alfandrl 
argues. This could occur only, he believes, where the threat 
faced is really serious, as for example in the case of terrorism. 
He bases his view on an analysis of the reasons for the 
introduction of social protection in the first place: that Is as 
a means of social control. Historical analysis of the 
development of the welfare state In Europe makes lt clear that 
social security provision was not the result of state 
philanthropy. Fear of vagrancy and social discontent, along with 
the needs of a developing capitalist economy, were the driving 
forces behind social legislation In France, as In the rest of 
Europe. To limit entitlement too widely would, the argument 
goes, carry with lt serious risks to public order. Any group, in 
this case the immigrant population, whose means of support are 
removed, lose a sense of having a stake in society, and therefore 
any loyalty or respect for its institutions. 
The conclusion to the argument outlined above is that unlike 
Immigration law which is constantly changing and becoming 
increasingly restrictive reflecting the xenophobia across much of 
Western Europe: 
Le droit de la protection sociale fait preuve d'une 
remarquable stablllte, et choix volontalre ou contralnte 
des garde-fous mls en place - met sur le m~me plan Fran,als 
et lmmigres. <4> 
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It is essentially this view that I wish to examine. If the 
guiding principles are not reflected in the actual content of the 
laws and regulations then the assertion that immigrants and 
French are "sur le mame plan" cannot be justified. This chapter 
will therefore examine in some detail the content of both 
domestic legislation and the bi-lateral agreements in order to 
assess the validity of such a conclusion. 
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2.3 Principles in Practice 
The starting point for such an assessment is an examination of 
the specific conditions of entitlement to benefits, combined with 
an analysis of the degree to which they do in fact meet the !deal 
of equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals. 
A crucial component of the argument that citizens and non-
citizens have equal rights to social protection Is that a basic 
condition of entitlement to benefit Is not nationality, but 
residence interpreted in its least restrictive sense. Whilst 
this principle does certainly exist, there are a number of 
exceptions which suggests that it is not reflected in the detail 
of the law. 
Non-citizens who are not refugees, or who come from countries who 
have no agreement with France covering social assistance are 
often excluded from certain state funded non-contributory 
benefits. It is important to note that very few developing 
countries have such an agreement. The benefits concerned are 
the Allocation Supplementaire du Fonds National de Solidarite and 
the Allocation Speciale Vieillesse both for elderly peopl with no 
or limited pension rights, and the Allocation aux Adultes 
Handicappes. The law has recently changed: the condition of 
entitlement was based on nationality not residence, but the 
qualifying criterion Is now to be length of residence. At the 
time of writing the exact length had not been stated, although it 
has been suggested that this will probably involve fifteen years 
unbroken residence in France. 
A number of payments under aide sociale, theoretically open to 
all people resident in France, exclude certain non-citizens in 
the same way. This is done firstly by means of a condition of 
length of residence for specific benefits. French citizens, 
refugees and nationals of countries who have an agreement with 
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France covering social assistance, are not subject to such a 
condition. All other non-citizens have to fulfil! a residence 
condition of three years for aide medicale a domicile, and of 
fifteen years for the range of aide sociale payments for the 
elderly. This is hardly consistent with the view that the 
definition of residence in Article 124 does not refer to the 
length of stay. 
Further evidence of the potentially restrictive definition of 
residence is to be found in guidelines given by Philippe Seguin, 
Ministre des Affaires Sociales, in 1987 in response to a written 
question. He began by stating: 
La condition de residence est en regie generate consideree 
comma satisfaite lorsque la personne de nationalite 
etrangere demeure en France de maniere generate, et y a son 
principal etablissement. 
But the Minister then added further guidelines as to what factors 
should be taken into account by the Commissions d'Admission 
d'Aide Sociale <the decision making body for aide sociale 
applications). These included 
la situation de ces personnes en fonction de criteres de 
fait, et notamment des motifs pour lesquels !'interesse est 
venu en France, des conditions de son installation, des 
liens d'ordre personnel ou professionnel qu'il peut avoir 
dens notre pays, des intentions qu'il manifeste quanta la 
duree de son sejour. (5) 
These criteria, although apparently objective are sufficiently 
imprecise to be open to widely varying interpretation. It wi 11 
remain up to individual Commissions d'Admission d'Aide Sociale to 
determine what constitute suitable "liens d'ordre personnel ou 
professionnel", or adequate "conditions d' .... installation", and 
whether the claimant satisfies these criteria. The lack of 
detailed guidance on how local officials should interpret the 
criteria, in effect confers on them very wide administrative 
discretion. This leaves open the possibility that the assessment 
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of an individual's circumstances will be based on subjective 
value judgements. 
Thus whilst the condition of residence for the majority of 
contributory benefits is indeed defined in terms sufficiently 
broad that non-nationals are not generally excluded, this is 
clearly not the case for non-contributory benefits. Payment may 
be subject to conditions of length of residence as well as to 
potentially restrictive and possibly subjective criteria in the 
definition of residence. 
Alfandrl argues that immigration law, especially in terms of 
internal security and the control of illegal immigration, does 
not significantly affect entitlement to benefit for non-
nationals. The evidence does not support this contention. 
Changes in conditions of entitlement to family benefits over the 
last decade demonstrate the 'cross-over' between social 
legislation and immigration law. Payment of these benefits is 
subject to satisfactory immigration status for both the claimant 
and the children concerned, unlike the general condition of 
residence for all other social security benefits. Alfandrl 
concedes that this is an exception, but falls to establish the 
significance both in terms of the central role of these benefits 
in the revenue of large, low income families, and in the 
implications of the social security administration operating as a 
means of discouraging and of policing immigration. 
There are a wide range of benefits under the general heading of 
family benefits and they form a significant, and in some cases an 
essential proportion of the income of low paid families. Given 
the fact that immigrant families are generally both larger, and 
have a lower income than the average, the role of family benefits 
is even more important for them. Official figures illustrate 
this fact: for non-EEC nationals living in France, family 
benefits can raise pre-tax revenue by more than half again 
151.4%). (6) 
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It is instructive to examine the progressive tightening up of the 
qualifying conditions for family benefits, especially since 1983. 
Article L512 of the C.S.S. states: 
Beneficient de plein droit des prestations familiales dens 
les conditions fixees par le present livre les etrangers 
titulaires d'un titre exige d'eux en vertu soit de 
dispositions legislatives ou reglementaires soit de traites 
ou accords internationaux pour resider regulierement en 
France. 
In order to interpret this provision the CAFs referred to a 
ministerial circular of 16th March 1983, which established a 
lists of titres de sejour <the different categories of residence 
rights under immigration law) that could be accepted. It is 
significant that this document excluded any titre valid for three 
months or less, as well as the receipt of a first application for 
a titre. This affects both asylum seekers and recently arrived 
family members. 
Asylum seekers on being given leave to enter France have to apply 
for refugee status to OFPRA <Office Fran~aise de Protection des 
Refugies et Apatrides - the body which deals with requests for 
refugee status). It often takes over two years for such a 
request to be processed <27 months in 1984 (7), and there is some 
evidence to suggest that the situation has not improved since 
then). During this period asylum seekers hold a temporary titre 
valid for only three months, which is automatically renewed until 
such time as a decision is taken as to the status of the person 
concerned. There is often intense suspicion of asylum seekers, 
since it is felt that the right to request asylum is being used 
as a loophole to continue economic immigration. In actual fact 
the vast majority of all requests for refugee status are accepted 
either by OFPRA or at the appeal stage; such a view is therefore 
based more on prejudice than on fact. 
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Members of a family who have recently entered France quite 
legally under Regroupement Familiale (family re-unification> 
legislation are often in possession only of a receipt of their 
first application for a titre. Family benefits were not 
therefore granted to many such families at first, despite the 
fact that their inability to produce theirtitre was the result 
not of illegal immigration status, but of the slow bureacratic 
process. 
This interpretation of article L512 was sucessfully contested by, 
for example, a judgement on 23rd May 1985 of the Lyon Commission 
de Premiere Instance de Securite Sociele <now the Tribunal des 
Affeires de Securite Sociale - the equivalent of the Social 
Security Appeal Tribunal in Britain). It concerned an asylum 
seeker who was appealing against the rejection of her claim for 
Allocations Femilteles <the approximate equivalent of child 
benefit in Britain). The commission found that the temporary 
titre valid for three months held by the woman in question was 
consistent with the requirements of Article L512, for although 
temporary it was in accordance with the "dispositions 
legislatives ou reglementaires" required to live in France 
legally. Explaining this decision the Commission stated In its 
findings that: 
.. une circulalre de ce genre, si elle tend a delimlter ou a 
preclser le champ d'applicatlon d'un texte legislatif, 
constltue une simple interpretation a envisager; 
Mais qu'en elle-m~me, tout comma une instruction 
ministerielle, elle n'a pas de force de loi; <8> 
Coincidentally, a law passed on 29th December 1986 containing 
various provisions concerning family policy, contained an 
addition to Article L512, namely article L512-2. This stated 
that a decree, which does have the force of law, would define 
those titres that CAFs should accept as proof of satisfactory 
immigration status. 
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There is no doubt that this represents a conscious decision to 
use the benefit system as a means of identifying and discouraging 
illegal immigration. At a press briefing on the <then) proposed 
Plan Famille, Mme Barzach, the Minister of Health explained: 
L'exigence de cette preuve de regularite pour !'attribution 
des prestations familiales preservers l'lntegralite des 
droits des etrangers en situation reguliere. Mais elle 
supprimera l'attralt de notre systeme de prestations 
familiales pour les clandestlns. Elle concourra ainsi a une 
meilleure ma!trlse des flux migratoires. (9) 
Thus the intention to discourage Illegal Immigration by removing 
what Is felt to be a major incentive Is clearly stated. It also 
appears that the social security administration is being used as 
a means of internal policing of immigration. An indication of a 
further move to make benefit entitlement subject to satisfactory 
immigration status is to be found in a bill drafted in 1987, 
proposing the following wording for Article 186 of the 
'C.F.A.S.': 
Les etrangers qui ne sent pas couverts par une convention 
lnternatlonale d'assistance et qui produisent un titre de 
sejour regulier defini par decret en Conseil d'Etat 
benificient:...... <10> 
There then follows a list similar to the existing one of those 
aide sociale benefits that can be claimed, with an additional 
condition of six months residence to qualify for aide medicale. 
Since there has been no primary immigration into France since 
1974, the two main groups of people <excluding EEC citizens> who 
have rights of entry are dependants and refugees. As noted above 
both these groups will be virtually debarred from claiming family 
benefits during the early stages of their stay In France. 
Granted that this period can extend to more than two years, this 
is a not insignificant exception. Recent entrants, many of whom 
may have fled persecution and are going through the difficult 
process of re-adjustment, find their situation made even more 
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difficult and precarious by being denied access to basic income 
maintenance. It is difficult not to conclude that, quite apart 
from the government's attack on illegal immigration, the benefit 
system is being cynically used as a means of discouraging even 
legal immigration. 
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2.4 Creating Illegal Immigrants 
It appears not unreasonable, however, to exclude Illegal 
Immigrants from entitlement to benefit. That is, until one 
examines just who is contained within the definition of an 
'Illegal immigrant', and how this came about. Illegal Immigrants 
- clandestins in French - Is a term which conjures up Images of 
secret landings on deserted beaches; of people who are 
deliberately deceiving the authorities, generally for doubtful 
and even criminal reasons. French official discourse certainly 
serves to reinforce this Impression. Danlele Lochak has studied 
the frequency with which clandestin occurs In conjunction with 
the term or Idea of delinquent. This Is not only found In the 
discourse of the far-right and of the 'respectable' right, but In 
speeches made by Fran~ols Mitterrand and Laurent Fablus, his 
former socialist prime minister. For example In a speech to the 
Ligue des Drotts de l'Homme In April 1985 referring to Illegal 
Immigrants Mitterand commented, 
pas de logement, pas de travail, done le travail au nolr, ou 
blen on peut imaginer ...... <11) 
In actual fact the majority of people In France who are 
classified as Illegal Immigrants have entered France quite 
legally, and may have been settled there for some time. There 
are a range of possible reasons for their subsequent 
reclassification as illegal Immigrants, for example, overstaying 
temporary leave or failing to renew strictly within the time 
llml ts. 
One of the most important categories of illegal immigrants are 
dependants entering France as visitors and settling without 
proper authorisation. The reasons for this can be understood by 
looking at the working of the legislation governing family re-
unification. The right of entry into France of non-EEC 
dependants has been progressively eroded since the early 1970s. 
In July 1974 the right was completely suspended, but re-Instated 
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in July 1975 on condition that the whole family moved to France. 
In November 1977 a decree set strict conditions for dependants 
entering France, in particular that they should have no right to 
work. This was subsequently annulled by a decision of the 
Consetl d'Etat dated 8/12/78, as a result of an action taken by 
GIST! <Groupe d'Informatton et de Soutten de Travatlleurs 
Immtgres>. The court upheld the right to a family life for 
foreigners living in France, as for citizens, as expressed in the 
preambule to the 1946 constitution. It recognised that to 
exercise this right dependants entering France should be allowed 
to work, and therefore to contribute to the family economy. 
When the Socialist government came to power in 1981 they 
initially relaxed the conditions by removing the requirement that 
the whole family had to come at one time. However, by 1984 it 
was felt that the procedures governing Regroupement Familial' 
were creating problems for the proper integration of the arriving 
family members. This was because dependants were not arriving 
through the official channel of introduction administered by the-
Office National d'Immigration <O.N.I.>, who co-ordinate the whole 
process of immigration and act as a reception agency. Instead 
families were entering France as visitors with temporary leave, 
and then requesting change of immigration status. Consequently a 
decree was passed in December 1984 to the effect that dependants 
would have to gain prior entry clearance through O.N. I., it would 
no longer be possible to apply for change of status after arrival 
in France. Clearance is subject to a number of conditions: 
principally the requirement for the worker to be able to house 
and support his/her dependants adequately, conditions which are 
defined in strict and precise terms. 
Dependants continue to enter France to rejoin their 
spouse/parent, even ifs/he cannot fulfil! the conditions set out 
in the legislation, which is often the case. The condition for 
housing is expressed in terms of so many square metres per person 
at levels which althogh ideal, are felt by many people to be 
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unfair. For example the minimum requirement for a family with 
two children Is 43 square metres, and 79 square metres for a 
family with six children. It is especially diflcult to meet this 
condition in the Paris region and in other large conurbations 
where the principal concentrations of immigrant communities are 
to be found, Rented property in these areas is scarce and 
expensive, especially of the sort of size required to house a 
large family. There is a particular problem In that the 
organisations which adminster low cost housing <H.L.M. -
Habitation a Loyer Modere), only consider applications to house 
people already present in France, yet entry clearance for 
dependants entering France is subject to definite proof that the 
'sponsor' already has the accomodation. It is not difficult to 
see why the housing condition defined in such terms excludes the 
legal entry of many dependants. 
The requirement to prove sufficient resources can also act as a 
barrier to the re-unification of families. Whilst a reasonable 
income is entirely desirable, it Is unrealistic to demand this of 
a section of the population who earn some of the lowest wages in 
France. Figures produced by the CNAF in 1984 show that French 
families with four or more children have an average annual income 
of approximately 88,000FF whereas for non EEC nationals with the 
same size family it is only 58,000FF. <12> Furthermore for the 
latter the greater proportion of this income is made up of family 
benefits. There therefore exists a 'Catch 22' situation similar 
to the refusal of H.L.M. administrators to accept housing 
applications for family members about to come to France. Income 
maintenance benefits for families on a low Income administered 
principally by 'C. N. A. F.' which would significantly supplement 
the revenue of such families, cannot be claimed, or taken Into 
account, until the family is in France. 
Understandably the rules are by-passed by families desperate to 
live together and to bring up their children jointly. The 
consequences of this are that an increasing number of families 
-54-
suffer poverty and hardship, as well as risks to their health. 
This group contains a large proportion of children and women of 
child-bearing age who will not only be be excluded from family 
benefits and but as a consequence, from proper medical care 
especially during pregnancy and early childhood. 
There is a certain irony in the fact that a piece of legislation 
designed to promote family life, and especially to improve the 
situation of low income families, should have the effect of 
relegating many of the poorest families in France to the margins 
of society and to increase the risks of illness and disease. As 
Jean Quatremer pointed out, 
La suppression des allocations prenatales aux femmes 
etrangeres clandestines va rendre impossible, en fait, le 
suivi de la grossesse. M§me chose pour les allocations 
postnatales: !'enfant est invite a se developper 
clandestinement. <13> 
It is not only the legislation governing Regroupement Familial 
that has, in effect, encouraged illegal immigration. An 
important consequence of the Chirac government's immigration 
policy between 1986 and 1988 was to 'create' illegal immigrants. 
Under the reforms carried through in the field of immigration by 
the previous Socialist government many non-citizens living in 
France were issued with a Carte de Resident, valid ten years and 
automatically renewable for many people. The sense of security 
that this provided, especially for people who had lived and 
worked in France for most of their lives, and with no ties with 
their country of origin, proved to be illusory. 
In September 1986 the Chirac government introduced a new 
Immigration Act, the Loi Pasqua. The most important aspect of 
the Act was to limit those categories of people receiving the ten 
year Carte de Resident automatically. Now excluded for example, 
are spouses during the first year of their marriage, even if 
married to a French citizen. They will only be given a ten year 
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carte de resident after a year if the marital relationship is 
proved to be genuine. The numerous practical obstacles in the 
way of this, in particular gaining entry to France in the first 
place or being granted extension of leave once there, may result 
in spouses being classified as illegal immigrants. People who 
have lived in France since before the age of ten also no longer 
have the right to automatic issue of a carte de resident, if they 
are given a prison sentence of 6 months or more, which can 
include the totting up of a number of minor sentences. As 
Daniele Lochak comments: 
La moindre pecadille peut aboutir a priver le jeune etranger 
de la securite que procure la carte de resident. <14) 
The same is true for those people who have lived in France for 
ten years or more, who can lose their right to a 'carte de 
resident' in the same circumstances. 
This can give rise to a situation where a settled person is 
refused renewal of their carte de resident, or a young person is 
not issued with their first 'carte de resident', and yet is not 
deported. It is somewhat illogical to refuse someone the right 
to stay in France, thereby depriving them of the means to lead a 
normal life, and yet not to deport them. 
It is perhaps the case that the reasons for refusal of a carte de 
resident may not be adequate grounds for deportation. For most 
groups of people such grounds are defined as being une menace a 
l'ordre public. Alternatively they may belong to a category of 
people who can only be deported in extreme circumstances, for 
example spouses of French citizens after the first year of 
marriage and parents of French children, that is where they are 
une menace grave a l'ordre public. There is one group who cannot 
be expelled at all: young people under eighteen. The consequence 
for all these groups is that, without a legal titre de sejour, 
the means to lead a normal life in France are removed: that is 
the right to work, and therefore to health, old age, family and 
unemployment benefits. The situation for young people who either 
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cannot or have not taken French nationality is perhaps the most 
serious. They cannot work and they will not receive the state 
funded Allocation d'Insertion <special unemployment benefit for 
young people with an Insufficient contribution record>. 
Thus Illegal Immigrants are 'created' who remain In France pushed 
onto the margins of society. The logic of the policy, aimed at 
reducing Immigration, must mean that it is expected that such 
people will leave France of their own accord. This is, in 
practice, unrealistic by any standards, where Immigrants long 
settled in France, with no base In, or links with their country 
of origin, are concerned, and this is even more obviously the 
case with young people who have never lived in their so called 
home country. The consequences cannot be other than to 
marginalise sections of French society, to push them further into 
poverty, and possibly into crime and lead to racial tension borne 
of resentment and exclusion. 
The reality of increasing poverty in France has been well 
documented recently, for example In a report to the Conseil 
Economique et Social presented by M. Joseph Wresinski, the late 
director of A.T.D. Quart Mbnde <Aide a Toute Detresse- Quart 
Monde, a pressure group concerned with poverty in France). The 
report notes In particular that a significant cause of poverty is 
the failure of the system of social insurance to provide adequate 
cover for all groups, with the consequence that a growing number 
of people are left without sufficient means to survive 
adequately. <15) A survey was carried out In 1986 by Medecins du 
Monde of the first 1,106 patients to resort to their free 
dispensary In Paris. The study was designed to examine the 
medical pathology of the patients and also their social 
characteristics, ~%of the S.C.S.s <Sans couverture social-
those with no social Insurance> were non-citizens. Of this 
proportion 13% were Maghrebins and 16% were from Afrique Noire. 
The great majority of this group (72%) were settled in France, as 
either asylum seekers, refugees or immigrant workers. The reason 
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therefore for lack of cover was not generally because they were 
on a temporary visit. Significantly the most common of all 
reasons for visiting the dispensary was pregnancy. One of the 
doctors working in the dispensary commented: 
En France, il vaut mleux lorsqu'on est enceinte soit ~tre 
assuree sociale, soit avoir de !'argent. Sinon le suivi 
medical de la grossesse est quasiment impossible. (16) 
The lack of cover for non-citizens especially in terms of health 
is a serious problem. Whilst an Important cause of this Is the 
extension of the definition of 'illegal immigrant', it is also a 
significant problem for those who are quite legally in France. 
For example refugees are granted a form of unemployment benefit 
for their initial period In France <Allocations d'Insertfon>; 
this then entitles them to social security health Insurance. 
However the length of time taken to grant this benefit, related 
to delays on the part of OFPRA, means that there may be a period 
of some months during which an asylum seeker cannot afford to 
fall 111 or become pregnant. There is a similar problem for 
newly arrived dependants, especially pregnant women. Depending 
on the stage of the pregnancy, the family may be excluded from 
certain family benefits which depend on precise timing of the 
claim( Allocations au Jeune Enfant>. Additionally, she may also 
be excluded, quite 'legally' from cover of the costs of the 
birth. This Is due to the fact that the Cafsses d'Assurance 
Maladfe require a three month period before claims can be made. 
This is demanded despite the fact that the husband may have been 
paying social security contributions for many years; and that 
there is no doubt but that she qualifies as his ayant-droft, and 
did so under a bi-lateral agreement before coming to France. If 
the amendment to article 186 of the C.F.A.S. were ever to be 
passed the effect would be to exclude all these groups from any 
means at all of gaining even minimal help with the costs of 
health care from aide sociale. 
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Contrary to the view taken by Alfandri immigration law does 
seriously affect rights to benefits. The requirement of proof of 
satisfactory immigration status for family benefits is only the 
tip of the iceberg. The cynical use of the benefit system as a 
means of discouraging immigration, allied to the creation of 
illegal immigrants in France are much more far reaching in their 
implications. The argument that the ordre public securitaire 
only rarely takes precedence over the ordre public social, 
generally when it is a question of national security (for example 
when there is a threat of terrorism> Is fallacious. The results 
of the Lot Pasqua have been to deprive a number of immigrants of 
the means with which to lead a normal life in France. 
Paradoxically, the removal of basic rights to work and to social 
security benefits, in the name of public order, reduces the 
effectiveness of social control. People who have no job, no 
money, inadequate housing and who are subject to racial 
discrimination feel excluded from society. This sense of 
exclusion, both objective and subjective, leads to a flouting of 
the rules of the society in which they have no stake, and to 
racial tension. Analyses of the reasons behind the 1985 riots in 
British cities <Brixton, Toxteth, Handsworth etc> have 
acknowledged the role of poverty and exclusion in building up 
resentment. Ironically then, the measures in the Lot Pasqua 
designed to enforce public order may prove to be counter 
productive, and to produce the opposite effect. It is 
unrealistic to expect people to 'go home', especially if lt is 
somewhere that they have either never been, or have no real 
contact with. 
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2.5. Family Law 
Conditions of entitlement to a whole range of benefits in France, 
especially for dependants of an assure social are based on 
definitions of family relationships. When these relationships 
are being determined for immigrant families, the interplay 
between the law of the country of origin and French domestic law 
is complex and even contradictory. In theory when French law 
refers to a spouse, to children for whom one is responsible and 
to minors, this should be determined with reference to the law of 
the country of origin. This principle, stated in Article 3 A13 
of the Code civil, has been confirmed by case law on marriage, on 
the age of majority, and on the status of children- natural or 
adoptive. In addition bi-lateral agreements have been drawn up 
with various countries in an attempt to clarify areas where the 
Jaws conflict. 
In practice the minority groups who are seriously affected by 
such problems, are those which come from countries where family 
law is based on non-European traditions, that is, principally 
Muslims. It is instructive to analyse the practical implications 
of differing definitions of the family on entitlement to benefit. 
Polygamy is the most obvious cultural difference in family 
composition. In theory French case law, based on loi 
international privee recognises the legitimacy of polygamous 
marriages. In 1972 a Dahomian appealed to the Conseil d'Etat 
against the decision of a Prefet to expel his second wife. The 
court overturned the 'Prefet•s• ruling on the grounds that the 
right to a family life should be defined with regard to the 'lot 
personnelle' of the person concerned, and that: 
pour un dahomien polygame, la vie familiale normale suppose 
done la presence des deux femmes. <17> 
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In practice social security Jaw does not accept the validity of 
such marriages. Article 313-3 of the C.S.S. lists those 
dependants who can claim health benefits and pension rights on 
the basis of the assure social's contributions. In the first 
place there is 'le conjoint'- the spouse, In the singular. A 
circular Issued by the C.N.A.M. <Caisse National d'Assurance 
Maladie- the principal health Insurance organisation) in August 
1979 stresses this Interpretation: 
Le fait d'entreten!r au foyer plus!eurs epouses m~me 
leg!times au regard du droit musulman, ne peut ~tre 
cons!dere comme const! tuant la vie mar! tale. <18) 
The only concession Is that If, for example the first wife starts 
work and Is therefore insured in her own right, then another wife 
can take her place as ayant droit. 
This can be argued to be overly restrictive, especially In the 
light of a law Introduced in 1978 which recognises a common law 
wife as an ayant droit, and allows a Frenchman to claim benefits 
for both a wife with whom he no longer lives and his common law 
wife. Thus two partners can be and are effectively recognised 
under French social security law, but only as long as they do not 
live under the same roof. A recent report for the Commissariat 
General du Plan, comments: 
L'application de ce principe a la seconde epouse residant en 
France aurait la mer!te de rendre nos regles coherentes et 
de regler des situations qui pour ne pas ~tre tres 
frequentes n' en sent moins d!ff!c!le a v!vre. <19> 
There is a further irony: Article 313-3-4 of the C.S.S. bestows 
the quality of ayant droit on any of a number of people living 
under the same roof as the assure social, if they are devoting 
their time exclusively to bringing up at least two of his 
children and doing the housework. The list of possible ayants 
droit in this category includes anyone from a great niece to a 
grandmother. Since the wives in a polygamous marriage are likely 
to be doing just this, it does appear somewhat unjust. 
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In terms of pension rights Article L353-3 of the C.S.S. allows a 
pension to be split between the latest and former wife (wives), 
not subsequently remarried, of an assure social in the event of 
his death. However in the same circumstances the pension cannot 
be split between wives of a polygamous marriage. This is hardly 
consistent with a view expressed by Philippe Chen!llet, a 
specialist in social and economic administration, who states 
categorically: 
Le systeme de protection soc!ale fran~aise face a la 
vieillesse ne semble nullement d!scr!m!natoire envers les 
!mmigres, ni dans ses fondements, ni dans ses regles, ni 
dans la pratique administrative qui permet la mise en 
oeuvre. (20> 
Family benefits are principally concerned with the welfare of 
children, and as such the regulations are not generally concerned 
with the status of the mother. However, it is not possible to 
pay Allocation au Jeune Enfant to more than one wife at a time, 
since the law cannot accept two concurrent pregnancies. There is 
the additional factor that under Immigration law it is not 
possible for a man settled in France to bring in more than one 
wife. Therefore few second or third wives of a polygamous 
marriage are actually living In France, and many of those that 
are, are unlikely to have satisfactory immigration status, and so 
will not be able to claim benefit themselves for their children. 
The decision cited above concerned the case of a second wife 
already present in France; since it is no longer possible to 
request a change of immigration status once in France, this 
situation is unlikely to recur. 
Polygamy is therefore not recognised in practice as a legitimate 
form of family organisation. The fact that social security law 
allows a claim for a common law wife and an ex wife at the same 
time, indicates that the motivation probably has less to do with 
a concern for expenditure than with a deliberate decision to 
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discriminate against members of a culture that allows a man to 
Jive with two or more wives, and to have children by them. 
The institution of Kafala in Muslim Jaw does not create any 
problems in social security law in terms of the definition of 
what constitutes a family. Kafaia is a practice similar to 
adoption, where a child is given to another family or couple to 
bring up as their own. Often this occurs where a couple is 
childless, or where it is felt that that the child will be given 
a better chance in life with the other family. The main 
differences compared with adoption are that the natural parents 
do not repudiate the child and give up all rights, and that the 
arrangement, although it has a long tradition in some Muslim 
societies, has been expressed only relatively recently in a legal 
form. The definition in social security law refers to having a 
child a charge (i.e. having responsibility for a child), and 
this is defined broadly as follows: 
est considere comme ayant un enfant a charge toute personne 
qui assume d'une maniere generale, le logement, la 
nourriture, l'habillement, et !'education de cet enfant. Le 
fait pour un assure de ne pas avoir la garde d'un enfant, 
n'implique pas necessairement qu'il n'en a pas la charge. 
<21) 
However, here again immigration Jaw affects entitlement to 
benefit. Firstly, a child taken in under Kafala may not even be 
given right of entry under regroupement familial legislation, 
which requires proof of the status of the relationship. 
Entitlement to benefit in this case therefore becomes academic. 
Secondly, the requirement to provide proof of proper immigration 
status for the child or children for whom family benefits are 
being claimed often takes the form of legal proof of filiation. 
Under, for example Algerian family Jaw Kafala is legally 
established by means of either a court hearing, or a statement 
_witnessed by a notaire. However it often remains an informal 
arrangement. C. A. F.'s will only accept legal proof of Kafala, 
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and generally only that provided by a court hearing. A statement 
made by Madame Barzach demonstrates that this requirement forms 
part of the general policy of using the benefit system as a means 
of discouraging illegal Immigration: 
Cette mesure reduira l'incitation actuelle due a 
1' !nsuff!sance des dispositions d'appl!cation du code de la 
Securite soc!ale, a l'egard del'arr!vee, du sejour d'enfants 
qui peuvent ~tre sans lien de filiation direct. C22) 
It Is also the case that, as for polygamy, French law is 
unwilling to acknowledge a form of family organisation alien to 
French culture. It is again Ironic that while the definition of 
being responsible for a child is a very broad one, clearly 
intended to protect the maximum number of children, there appear 
to be a deliberate exclusion of families that have not taken on 
French values. 
There are two situations, where unlike the above, the loi 
personnelle (personal law/status) of a non-national does take 
precedence over French family law. Firstly, for the Conge 
Parental de Naissance ou d'Adoption the father is given three 
days extra paid holiday on the birth of a child or on the arrival 
of an adoptive child. The conditions of entitlement for this 
benefit when the birth of a child is concerned, are that the 
household should be 'legal': that is, the father must recognise 
the child and he must live with the mother. However under Muslim 
law an illegitimate child cannot be recognised by the father. 
Therefore since in this case loi personnelle of the claimants 
country of origin takes precedence, the child cannot be legally 
recognised if the parents are not married, and so the benefit 
will not be paid. 
The second case where French domestic law is overridden by the 
law of the claimant's country of origin concerns the defini t!on 
of the age of major! ty for payment of Allocation de Soutien 
Fami It al. The payment of this benefit continues as long as the 
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child or children are minors. Since the age of majority is lower 
notably in a number of Third World countries, this can 
effectively exclude the payment of benefit for children who would 
qualify for longer if they were French. 
It does appear that the conflict between French domestic law, 
international loi privee and the family law of the country of 
origin is cynically resolved according to whichever gives fewest 
rights. Thus polygamy and Kafala are not recognised by French 
social security law, but Muslim law on the legitimacy of a child 
and on the age of majority is accepted. 
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2.6 Residence and Repatriation 
The view that the condition of entitlement to welfare benefits is 
residence and not nationality is held 
discriminatory nature of the system. 
to be proof of the non-
This clearly has to be 
qualified in the light of restrictive guidelines on the 
definition of residence and of requirements of proof of legal 
immigration status. There is a further qualification: whether it 
is correct to state that residence as a criterion is necessarily 
just in a system based on insurance type contributions and on 
taKation. 
A significant proportion of immigrant workers in France are men 
whose families have remained in the country of origin, and who, 
as a result will return there on retirement. Whilst this 
proportion has decreased with the policy of family re-unification 
in France, it remains an important category- partly due to the 
constraints of regroupement familial legislation itself. These 
workers will all be paying French taKes and obligatory social 
security contributions. 
This would enable a Frenchman's family to claim health benefits 
on the basis of his contributions, and to benefit from his 
pension and unemployment insurance. His family would also 
qualify for the range of family benefits. Although funded by the 
employers' contributions they were, before 1978, in effect a 
right based on employment; entitlement is now open to all 
families in France. Finally, the state funded non-contributory 
benefits, and aide sociale are funded by taKation, and, depending 
on need, are open to most people resident in France. 
The principle of territoriality which underpins the benefit 
system means that, where there is no appropriate bi-lateral 
agreement an immigrant worker's family who have not joined him in 
France receive none of the insurance cover that they would 
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qualify for as his ayants droit if they were In France. Equally 
they would not be eligible for any of the family benefits, nor 
any of the benefits funded by taxation. The worker himself, upor 
return to his country of origin, might not be able to draw his 
pension, or receive invalidity benefits after an industrial 
Injury. In these circumstances the condl tion of residence l tsell 
can be held to be discriminatory. 
It is argued, however, that the complex system of bi-lateral 
agreements on social security, and in some cases on aide sociale, 
ensure that the system remains equitable for the majority of 
immigrant workers not settled in France with their families. It 
Is worth examining the scope of these agreements in some detail 
in order to ascertain whether they do in fact fulfil the role 
attributed to them. Before doing so it will be useful to provide 
a context by looking at the historical development of the system 
of bi-lateral agreements for social security and social 
assistance. 
The system has its origins in the labour migrations in Europe in 
the early twentieth century, when the scope was limited to 
agreements on industrial injury and disease compensation. After 
the Second World War the shortage of labour in France was 
accompanied by a dramatic expansion in the number of agreements 
established, and in their scope. Initially these were drawn up 
with neighbouring countries, that is, with countries with a 
similar degree of economic development and therefore similar 
standards of social protection. The agreements were as a result 
based on the principle of reciprocity. With increasing economic 
immigration from developing countries, especially from North West 
Africa, the nature of the agreements changed. The principle of 
reciprocity was no longer straightforward to apply, both due to 
the different levels of development and to the related fact that 
the migrations were one way phenomena. Consequently the scope of 
these agreements, drawn up initially in the 1960's and based on a 
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system of flat rate payments made by France, was much more 
restrictive than the scope of those with European countries. 
With the development of the EEC, many of the early agreements 
have been superceded by the multi-lateral agreements under the 
Treaty of Rome. There remain about thirty bi-lateral agreements 
which link France to the countries of origin of the Immigrant 
population. They are a disparate collection of legislation that 
bears all the hallmarks of a series of unconnected measures of 
expediency. The one element that they have in common, 
particuarly In the case of those with developing countries, is 
that they are designed to protect people in employment. This Is 
a source of some of the present problems in the current economic 
climate, as will be shown below. The contrast in the scope of 
protection subsists when, for example, one compares the 
agreement with Mall to that with Switzerland. There are however 
variations between agreements with neighbouring African 
countries, which are far less easily explicable, and which lead 
to dlscrlmlnatlon lacking In any logic, between immigrants from 
different African states. 
Under the majority of such agreements health cover Is provided 
for the families remaining In the country of origin, and for some 
workers on retirement. As outlined In the previous chapter, this 
operates on the basis of a fixed sum, calculated In relation to 
the health care costs In that country, paid by the French Caisse 
to the equivalent organisation In the country of origin. The 
cover enjoyed by the dependants Is obviously of a lower standard 
than If they had been In France. It Is also much more limited, 
For example, there Is no maintien du droit by which people In 
France benefit for an additional twelve months cover If their 
situation changes, and they can no longer be defined as ayants 
droit. Additionally, the right to health care for the dependants 
Is based on the man being In work; If he becomes unemployed or 
retires, all health protection Is lost, which would not be the 
case lf the family were resident in France. 
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The right to a pension accrued while working In France Is, under 
the agreements, open to immigrant workers who have returned to 
their country of origin. There are, however, two situations 
where, even when there is an agreement with the country 
concerned, the worker or his family Jose out. Firstly, the 
fringe benefits provided by the 'Caisses', for example free 
holidays and pre-retirement courses, are not open to a worker who 
has left France. Secondly, the widow's pension is not payable to 
the surviving spouse outside France, although she may be eligible 
for a Jump sum payment on the basis of her husbands 
contributions. There are also significant variations as to the 
method by which pension entitlement is calculated, especially In 
the case of someone who has built up partial pension rights In 
more than one country. Quite apart from the !llog!cal!ty of such 
variations, and the consequent bureaucratic labyrinth through 
which the person concerned has to find a way, this can result In 
delays and even losses of entitlement, causing significant 
hardship. 
Finally unemployment benefit remains strictly territorial, even 
under the agreements. Payment Is subject to being registered for 
work with A.N.P.E. <Agence Nationale pour l'Emploi). It cannot 
therefore be claimed by e worker who, made redundant, has chosen 
to return to his country of origin, even temporarily. It Is 
possible however for the worker to take advantage of the aide a 
la reinsertton <repatriation assistance>, which Includes a Jump 
sum payment In compensation for loss of benefit entitlement. A 
condition of acceptance of this aid is that the recipient 
undertakes not to return to France. 
Family benefits are not funded by !nd!v!dual contributions and 
therefore the argument Is slightly different. They are however 
covered by the bi-lateral agreements. Families remaining In the 
country of origin receive payments of differing amounts and 
frequency, either directly, as In Morocco, or through the local 
social security system. The only benefit payable Is allocation 
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familiale ; the agreements do not cover the range of benefits 
which supplement the income of large, low income or single parent 
families in France. 
The rates at which benefit is paid, whether sent directly to the 
families from C.N.A.F. or received via the equivalent 
organisation in the country, are all dramatically lower than the 
rates for metropolitan France. Based on figures for July 1981 a 
Togolese family with four children resident in France would 
receive 1,400FF a month of allocation familiale. If the mother 
and children were in Togo the payment they would get, after a 
substantial share had been taken the Togolese authorities 
<120FF>, would be only 80FF. If one pushes this comparison to 
the extreme and takes the example of a family with ten children, 
then the difference would be 4,317FF if resident in France and 
still only 80FF in Togo. <23) This is because virtually all the 
bi-lateral agreements limit the number of children for whom 
benefit can be claimed abroad to a maximum of four. 
This is hardly convincing evidence of a fair and just system, 
however one views the source of funding for family benefits; that 
is through employers' contributions. Before 1978 a condition of 
entitlement to benefit was to be in employment, albeit subject to 
numerous exceptions, including, notably, those on unemployment 
benefit. Since that date payment of family benefits has been 
open to all resident in France, regardless of their employment 
status. Whether one views the employers' payment as, indirectly, 
a deduction from wages, or as now the equivalent of a form of 
company or payroll tax, it can be argued that all who work or who 
have paid taxes have, at least, a moral entitlement to family 
benefits. The fact that families remain in the country of 
origin, either by choice, or as a result of the constraints of 
the regroupement familial legislation, should not mean that they 
lose out so dramatically on payment of benefit. This is 
especially true in the light of the man's contribution to the 
French economy as a worker who has paid taxes, often for many 
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years. However to suggest that dependants remaining in the 
country of origin should receive the same level of benefit as 
those in France,is not a realistic proposition: the cost of 
living is generally lower in developing countries, and there is 
the risk of creating economic and social disequilibrium in these 
countries. 
The 1978 change in the conditions of entitlement to family 
benefits has recently given rise to a further inequality. Up 
until 1985 the C.N.A.F. continued to pay family benefits for the 
families of workers on unemployment benefit, remaining in the 
country of origin. Then in December 1985 the C.N.A.F. issued a 
circular, apparently in response to ministerial directives, to 
the effect that this practice should cease: 
Les travailleurs strangers en pre-retraite, les 
beneficiaires de la garantie de ressources ainsi que d'une 
maniere generale tous ceux qui sont au chOmage, que! que 
soit le type d'indemnites qu'ils per~oivent, ne peuvent 
continuer a percevoir les prestations prevues par les 
conventions internationales signees par la France. C24> 
The minister argued that in issuing his directive, he was simply 
applying the law as set out in the bi-lateral agreements. The 
basis of his argument is to be found in Article 46 of the 1980 
Franco-Algerian agreement, the first of the agreements to be 
redrafted since the change in 1978. This states that in order 
for families remaining in the country of origin to qualify for 
family benefit they should meet the conditions set out in French 
social security law. Article 89 of the accompanying Arrangement 
Administratif of October 1981 interprets this condition as being 
in employment, based on either a certain level of pay or of hours 
worked per month. This interpretation is justified on the basis 
that since 1978 French law has changed, and no longer contains 
any reference to ch6meurs, since all now qualify for family 
benefits. 
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The cutting of allocations familiales for all families of 
unemployed workers remaining in the country of origin by the 
C.N.A.F. was totally unjustified. Ministerial directives 
specifically referred to Algerians only, since this was the 
first, and at the time, only agreement to be redrafted after 
1978. All the other agreements refer to the provisions of French 
social security Jaw prior to this date: that Is where ch~meurs 
are specifically included as a category who qualify for benefit. 
However, even allowing for the change in the Jaw which the 
Algerian agreement took into account, it seems ludicrous that a 
measure designed to extend protection to all families In France 
should have the effect of restricting it for families outside 
France. GISTI have argued further that this Is quite possibly 
illegal. Certainly at least the spirit of French domestic Jaw is 
breached, if not the actual letter. 
It is difficult not to view such measures as another example of 
the deliberate use of the social security system to control or 
reduce the numbers of immigrants living in France. Perhaps it Is 
hoped that workers in France will give up their rights to 
unemployment benefit and return to their country of origin. Yet 
the actual effect wil be for the workers concerned to make every 
attempt to get their families to join them In France. This 
possibility Is noted in the report to the Commissariat General 
du Plan: 
En accrolssant sans aucune justification serleuse la 
dlsparite deja forte de traitement entre families residentes 
et non residentes et en precipitant ces dernieres dans un 
veritable denuement des lors que le chef de famllle est 
chOmeur, cette nouvelle reglementat!on constitue une 
Incitation directe et puissante aux regroupements familiaux 
de fait ..... <emphasis in the original text> (25) 
Non-contributory benefits: aide sociale and the handful of 
directly state-funded benefits are not payable outside France. 
Here again one questions the justice of the condition of 
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residence, however widely it might or might not be interpreted. 
Immigrant workers pay the same rates of tax as equivalent French 
workers but their families remaining in the country of origin 
will not have anything like the same level of social protection. 
This will not only affect the families, but also the workers 
themselves upon retirement. They will not be eligible for any of 
the 'top-up' payments for people with inadequate pensions. 
The situation of a worker who has returned to his country of 
origin after suffering a minor industrial injury, which is 
sufficient to prevent him from finding another job may be 
particularly serious. His injury may entitle him only to a small 
disability pension, as this is based on an assessment of the 
percentage disability. However he is unlikely to have been able 
to accrue sufficient contributions to qualify for an adequate 
retirement pension, due to his shortened working life. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not an uncommon 
situation, especially as immigrant workers are employed in areas 
of industry where there is a proportionately higher risk of 
industrial injury. Additionally, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, the provision for retraining after an accident at 
work is completely inadequate for the majority of immigrants. 
For both contributory and non-contributory benefits the condition 
of residence is not a guarantee of fair and equal treatment, 
regardless of nationality. Firstly, for nationals of a country 
with no bi-lateral agreement with France who either return to 
their country of origin, or whose families remain there, there is 
virtually no protection. It matters little what contributions or 
what taxes have been paid by the worker; both he and his family 
will lose any benefits if they cannot meet the residence 
condition. When this factor is considered in conjunction with 
the constraints of immigration law on family re-unification the 
system appears to be particuarly discriminatory. 
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The bi-lateral agreements, which are supposed to work as a check 
on serious discrimination do not appear to fulfil this aim. They 
do offer a greater measure of protection by waiving the condition 
of residence, but this is only in certain circumstances. The 
amount of family benefit actually payable is so much lower than 
for families in France that the fact that it is paid to families 
remaining abroad in reality represents only a minor concession. 
The cutting off of family benefits and health insurance for 
families of unemployed immigrant workers remaining abroad is a 
blatant example of unequal treatment between residents and non 
residents. The report to the Commissariat General du Plan, cited 
above strongly criticises this particular aspect of the system: 
!1 ne se revele ni assez contraignant pour emp~cher le 
developpement d'interpretations unilaterales des engagements 
dans un sens restrictif, ni assez souple pour epouser sans 
heurt les evolutions du droit interne ou de la conjoncture 
(chOmage, par example). <26> 
The difference in treatment between different nationalities is 
the other significant area of discrimination. Other than EEC 
countries the only countries to have an agreement with France 
which provides for the protection of unemployed people are 
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and the United States. There are 
similar exceptions to the provision of social assistance - the 
non-contributory and discretionary benefits- under the bi-
lateral agreements. The aim of reciprocity, applied to all the 
agreements, is the fundamental reason for the undermining of the 
principle of equality of treatment between nationals and non-
nationals. 
Thus the argument that a system based on contributions is 
inimical to discrimination on the basis of nationality does not 
hold up. Ironically this is precisely because of the other 
factor which is held up as evidence of the non-discriminatory 
nature of the social security system: the condition of residence. 
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2.7 International conventions 
International conventions on social security and social 
assistance drawn up by organisations of which France Is a member 
are held to operate as safeguards against unreasonable 
discrimination. The content of, for example, the European Social 
Charter, the United Nations Convention on refugees and 
International Labour Organisation articles 118 and 143, defines 
Ideal standards for fair and just treatment in this area. For 
example article 3 of the l.L.O. convention 118 states: 
Tout membre pour Jequel la presente convention est en 
vigueur dolt accorder sur sa territolre, auK ressortlssants 
de tout autre Membre pour lequel Jadlte convention est en 
vigueur, l'egalite de traltement avec ses propres 
ressortissants au regard de sa legislation, tant en ce qui 
concerns l'assujettlssement que le droit auK prestatlons, 
dans toute branche de securlte soclale pour laquelle 11 a 
accepte les obligations de la convention. 
However an examination of precisely which conventions France has 
ratified shows the limitations of such a view. For example, 
whilst it has ratified the I.L.O. convention 118, this is with 
the significant exception of those sections concerned with 
unemployment and old age. A further consideration is that, for 
the conventions to have any legal force they must also have been 
ratified by the country of origin of those non-nationals 
concerned. For the majority of developing countries this Is not 
a realistic proposition: their economies are not sufficiently 
developed to support social welfare systems on the scale of 
Western Industrialised nations. Even if such agreements 
theoretically have some legal force, the obstacles for any 
Individual or group seeking to enforce Its rights against 
apparently conflicting national legislation are almost 
insurmountable. 
-75-
The evidence of discrimination in French social security and 
social assistance law discussed in this chapter, demonstrates how 
far short France falls of the ideal of equality of treatment for 
nationals and non-nationals set out in the international 
conventions. Immigrants in France are faced with a range of 
additional conditions to qualify for benefit. This, as shown, 
includes conditions of length of residence; requirements to prove 
settled immigration status, and discriminatory definitions of the 
status of family relationships. The strictness with which the 
principle of teritoriality is enforced, means that families 
remaining in the country of origin are entitled to only limited 
social protection, and if the workers return to their country of 
origin either when unable to work, or on retirement they lose 
many of their rights to social protection. 
Membership of an international organisation, such as the I.L.O. 
brings with it a responsibility to bring domestic legislation 
into line with the relevant international conventions, in order 
to be able to ratify them. I.L.O. convention 143 concerning the 
social and economic rights of immigrants without legal 
immigration status came into force in December 1978. It affirms 
the right of all Immigrants, regardless of immigration status to 
social protection: 
Sans porter prejudice aux mesures destlnes a contrOler les 
mouvements mlgratoires a fin d'emploi en assurant que Ies 
travailleurs migrants entrent sur la territolre nationale et 
y sont employes en conformite avec la legislation 
pertlnente, le travallleur migrant dolt dans les cas ou 
cette legislation n'a pas ete respectee et dans lesquels sa 
situation ne peut etre regularisee, beneflcier pour lui-meme 
et pour sa famille de l'egalite de traitement en ce qui 
concerne les droits decoulant d'emplois anterieurs en 
matiere de remuneration, de securite soc!ale et autres 
avantages. 
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In the intervening ten years, France, in common with every other 
member state, should in principle, have been bringing domestic 
legislation into line in order to ratify this convention. 
Developments in both immigration and social policy legislation in 
this period have in fact moved in entirely the opposite 
direction. Increasingly, benefit entitlement has been made 
subject to proper immigration status, with the consequences of 
increasing poverty and risks to public health. 
The report to the Commissariat General du Plan cited above, 
examines the situation of immigrants and settled minorities in 
France. The report was completed in October 1987, but it has 
only just been released, a year later, by the present government. 
The reasons for the supression of the report by the previous 
government are not difficult to understand; the working party 
that produced it is highly critical of many aspects of France's 
treatment of immigrants and settled minorit1es. This is 
particuarly the case in the field of social protection. The 
authors note that a significant cause of the inequality of 
treatment between nationals and non-nationals, and between 
residents and non-residents, is in great part due to the attempt 
to apply principles of reciprocity in a situation where this is 
unrealistic. They recommend therefore that 
le principe de l'egalite de traitement entre travailleurs 
etrangers et nationaux devrait done prendre le pas sur la 
recherche d'une reciprocite qui n'est pas a la mesure des 
pays pauvres. <27) 
Their other major criticism is of the way in which the benefit 
system is being used as a means of discouraging immigration, and 
they conclude with the following comment: 
11 serait illusoire de penser qu'on puisse regular des flux 
humains par des reglementations restrictives ou des 
privations de droits. (28) 
The publication of the report by the present government may be an 
indication that it will take the issues raised seriously in 
developing future policy. 
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The position outlined at the beginning of this chapter, to the 
effect that French and immigrants alike were sur le m~me plan is 
completely unfounded: the actual social security and social 
assistance legislation and regulations are very far from 
reflecting the ideals of equality of treatment which underpin 
them. The law discriminates openly against immigrants from 
developing countries; the implications that this may have for 
sanctioning discriminatory administrative practices will be 
discussed in the next chapter 
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CHAPTER 3 - PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ACCESS 
3.1 Context 
Research into immigration and social security has, until very 
recently, been confined to the issue of consumption or 'over-
consumption' of benefits by immigrants, together with the issue 
of their legal entitlement to social security payments. Studies 
which look at other minority groups, for example the rural 
elderly, in relation to social security have a very different 
emphasis. Certainly patterns of consumption are Important, as Is 
entitlement, but the aim of such investigations Is to assess 
whether take up Is sufficiently high, and whether the range of 
benefits available is adequate and appropriate to the needs of 
the rural elderly. Depending on the outcome of such questions 
the main focus of such studies Is concerned with the Issue of how 
best to improve take up. The barriers which might discourage 
elderly people from making claims are investigated, and the ways 
In which the system could be made more sensitive and more 
responsive to the culture and needs of such a group is explored. 
In the case of Immigrants and ethnic minorities these questions 
are rarely posed. Instead, as I have shown, the question of 
consumption of benefits Is posed purely In the context of whether 
France, as the host country, Is gaining or losing from the 
phenomenon of Immigration, especially from the Third World. Those 
who 'demonstrate' the net profit the French social security 
system has made, and continues to make out of immigrants' 
contributions do so without challenging the underlying 
assumptions of their opponents, according to which, If 'over-
consumption' could be proved, then the logical Implication Is 
that Immigrants and their descendants should be repatriated. The 
discussion on legal entitlement to benefit Is placed In the 
context of whether or not the French social security system Is, 
at a formal level, even handed and non-discriminatory- that Is 
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whether non-nationals have the same rights as French people. The 
questions of whether the social security system is accessible to 
ethnic minority groups, and whether Its provisions are 
appropriate to their needs are not addressed. 
In the late 1980s it Is no longer appropriate to talk of the 
Immigrants of the 50s and 60s, and of their offspring, in terms 
of a foreign and transitory population. The vast majority are 
settled in France, a number have taken French nationality, as 
have a majority of their children. They have become a part of 
France's population, who have, in the same way as the rural 
elderly, particular needs and problems stemming from differing 
cultural values and experiences, which merit the attention of 
social policy researchers. 
My Intention at the beginning of my research was, centrally, to 
Investigate the way in which the French social security system 
treated ethnic minor! ties. In particular I was concerned to 
gather evidence on the take-up of benefits, and to Investigate 
the existence of barriers which may, In some way, restrict access 
to the system for this group. It rapidly became clear that there 
was compelling evidence to suggest that the law itself 
constituted a significant barrier. It was also apparent that 
there were two other principal areas which merited further 
investigation: one lay in problems related to language and 
literacy problems, and the other concerned the relationship 
between ethnic minorities and the bureaucracy. 
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3.2 The claimln~ process 
To investigate these matters I began with an analysis of the 
claiming process of a number of benefits, and gathered anecdotal 
evidence as to the problems experienced by claimants whose first 
language was not French, or who were clearly Identifiable as 
being of Immigrant origin. One particular type of claim that 
stood out as being worthy of further Investigation was that of 
Industrial Injuries benefits. There were a number of reasons for 
this. Firstly, immigrant workers are concentrated in the highest 
risk sectors of industry, especially building work and heavy 
engineering; secondly, they often possess a lower level of 
skills and experience in the work than their French counterparts, 
making them more prone to accidents at work; and thirdly, this 
appeared to be an area which caused considerable concern to those 
advisors and social workers that I interviewed. <1> 
When an employee has an accident at work, the first stage in 
making a successful claim is that the employer reports the 
accident. This involves the completion of two lengthy forms, one 
of which is given to the victim and forms a record of the 
treatment received throughout the period of incapacity. <See 
Appendix I> There are different sections for completion by the 
doctor and pharmacist Involved. It Is the claimant's 
responsibility to ensure that these are properly filled in, and 
forwarded to the Cafsse Regfonale d'Assurance Maladfe <C.R.A.M. 
the local health Insurance organisation). Quite apart from the 
complexity of language and structures In the explanatory notes, 
the print on this form Is very small and the variation In 
typeface Is visually confusing. The other form requires a 
detailed description of the accident. One copy of the former and 
the whole of the latter have to reach the local C.R.A.M. within 
48 hours. Without the employer's co-operation it Is virtually 
Impossible to make a successful claim. Despite the legal 
provision for heavy fines against an employer who does not 
comply, anecdotal evidence suggests that accidents at work, 
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especially where an immigrant worker is involved, may go 
unreported. This is probably due, in part, to the fact that the 
cost of funding Industrial Injuries benefits is borne by 
employers, in proportion to the number of reported accidents at 
each workplace, and in relation to the assumed level of risk in 
the nature of the work. Employers may therefore have an interest 
in failing to report an accident. In circumstances where a 
worker has a poor command of the French language and a fear of 
bureaucracy, and is perhaps concerned at the effect on his/her 
immigration status of losing a job, due to injury or dismissal, 
he or she may fail to press the employer to report an accident. 
Once an accident has been reported and the worker visited a 
doctor there begins a potentially lengthy process to assess the 
extent of the injury, and the degree of any resulting permanent 
disability. Numerous problems may arise when, for example the 
employer's description of the injuries received conflict with 
that of the victim's- especially if questioning takes place some 
time after the accident. Other difficulties arise out of 
difficulties in communication, which may make it difficult for 
the doctors involved to build up a clear understanding of the 
nature of the injury. This may be particularly true if the 
victim has to appear before a panel of doctors who put a series 
of complex and testing questions, designed to test thoroughly 
the claimant's assertions and thereby identify any fraudulent 
claims. This process, by its very nature, involves a high degree 
of language and advocacy skills and a claimant who does not speak 
French as a first language is at a particular disadvantage. 
If there is no permanent incapacity then, as long as the injury 
has been accepted as being due to an accident at work, the worker 
will receive free medical treatment and a higher than normal 
level of sick pay, until s/he has recovered. 
Numerous accounts given both orally, and recorded in written case 
studies, suggest that this process is far less straightforward 
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than it appears. If a worker Is, at the time of the accident, 
doing something that Is not strictly part of his/her job, or Is 
in a part of the factory or building site where s/he should not 
be, then it may well not be accepted as an Industrial injury. 
For example, an Algerian building worker was seriously injured at 
work when he fell while carrying a sack of cement up some stairs 
where there were nails and pieces of broken glass lying around. 
He claimed that he was doing this in response to a request from a 
bricklayer. His boss, however, claimed that he had had no right 
to be doing this, since he had been employed solely to mix 
mortar. As a consequence his injury was not recognised as 
resulting from an industrial accident, and he was entitled to 
sick pay at a lower rate, to only partial cover of the health 
care costs involved, and to no invalidity pension or possible re-
training. Despite appealing against the decision, he was 
unsuccessful at each stage, due, it seems, partly to his 
unfamiliarity with the demands of the process, to an 
insufficiently high level of language skills and to poor legal 
representation at a later stage. He had failed to find 
sufficient witnesses to prove his case because he believed that 
the support of his doctor was all that was necessary for him to 
win his case. This worker not only lost his case for the 
recognition of his injury as resulting form an industrial 
accident, but ended up without any means of financial support. 
His sick pay was stopped when a medical board deemed him once 
more fit for work, shortly after restarting work his injury 
became worse and he had to leave, his employer refused to sack 
him, thereby debarring him from an unemployment benefit claim. 
(2) 
If there is a permanent incapacity, then the level of invalidity 
pension paid is linked to an assessment of the seriousness of the 
disability, assessed in terms of a percentage. This involves 
further visits to a doctor; possible appearances before a panel 
of doctors, and maybe detailed and complex questioning and tests. 
In my interviews with advisors and social workers repeated 
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suggestions were made to the effect that !n the less 
straightforward cases immigrant workers without representation 
are awarded a lower percentage than their French counterparts. 
If the victim falls to attend for the necessary examinations then 
the claim will be seriously jeopardised. His/her absence may be 
due to a failure to understand the letters inviting him/her to 
attend, or to the fact that, on the advice of his/her doctor s/he 
has returned to his/her country of origin to convalesce. 
The final stage open to victims of an industrial injury !s to go 
through a process whereby s/he !s assessed !n terms of his/her 
ability to do another sort of work, and then, most importantly, 
provided with the necessary retraining and help with finding work 
<'Reclessement professionnel'). Since a significant part of this 
reassessment involves aptitude tests requiring a high level of 
language skills, including, for example, written tests, it !s 
very difficult for a worker whose first language !s not French to 
succeed. <>ne of the recommendations with which a small scale 
study carried out by the Service Social d'Aide aux Emigrants 
<SSAE> concludes, emphasises this point: 
Comme nous l'avons vu, le reclassement profess!onnel est 
d!ff!c!le a real!ser, 11 y aurait necess!te pour la COTOREP 
d'adapter les poss!bilites de reeducation profess!onnelle 
notamment en mat!ere de tests <con~us pour les fran~a!s> 
d' inventer des structures pour le rattrapage scola!re, la 
mise a n!veau de ceux qui le souha!tent et qui ont les 
capac!tes, et de multiplier les poss!b!l!tes. <3> 
This study found that of 61 foreign workers who had suffered an 
industrial injury, 16 had been forced to give up work completely 
as a result, and only one was given a 'Reclassement 
professionnel'. <4> Whilst these figures should be treated with 
caution - taking into account especially the lack of information 
on the severity or otherwise of the accidents, and the lack of 
comparable statistics for the French population as a whole, they 
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do serve to indicate the possible existence of a problem, and 
make a prima facie case to justify further investigation. 
A second Illustration of the complexities of the claiming process 
and the demands made on the claimant's linguistic abilities 
concerns maternity benefit <Allocation de Jeune Enfant - A.J.E.> 
I have chosen to look closely at this area as it affects women 
principally, who, traditionally in Muslim societies are not 
expected to have any dealings with the administration, and who, 
often confined to the home, have even less opportunity than their 
male counterparts to develop their language skills. This was 
also an issue which clearly concerned many of the social workers 
and advisors that I spoke to. 
A.J.E. is payable from the fourth month of pregnancy until the 
child reaches 3 months old, or longer on a means-tested basis if 
there is at least one child in the family under 3. In order to 
receive the A.J.E. it is necessary to comply strictly with 
various formalities. Firstly the pregnancy must be declared by 
the 15th week, or entitlement may be reduced accordingly. This 
is carried out by means of a Declaration de grossesse given to 
the woman by her doctor; she then completes it and posts or 
takes lt to her local C. A. F .. She must then provide proof of 3 
visits to a doctor during her pregnancy - one before 3 months, 
another during the 6th month, and the last In the second half of 
the eighth month. Throughout her pregnancy she will need to 
carry around with her a large pad of forms and explanatory 
documents, the Carnet de Maternite. This contains all the forms 
that she needs to have filled In by her doctor in order to 
qualify both for free medical treatment and for A.J.E .. Appendix 
II Is an example of ~of 29 forms to be completed throughout 
the process, and forwarded either to the local C.A.F. or to the 
C.R.A.M .. 
After the birth she has to provide proof of a series of medical 
examinations of her child at precisely determined points of 
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his/her development. In addition, she must formally claim 
allocations familiales, the form will usually be sent to her 
after she has declared her pregnancy. To claim beyond the three 
months a Declaration de ressources must be completed. <This is 
similar to an income tax return, the claimant has to provide 
Information as to her/his family's exact income and resources.) 
During this time, in order for the necessary medical expenses to 
be paid she will also be required to ensure that a large number 
of forms are sent off at the appropriate times to the local 
C.A.M. Since the primary responsibility for the completion of 
these formalities falls on the woman, who, If confined to the 
home, may possess a lower level of language skills than her 
husband, and who will almost certainly have less experience of 
dealing with bureaucracy, it seems likely that - at the very 
least - some or all of the benefits will not be claimed in some 
cases. Evidence from advisors and social workers strongly 
suggests that this Is the case- especially due to a failure to 
understand the Importance of the various deadlines for each stage 
of the payment, and to incomplete or incorrect completion of the 
forms. 
Many officials that I spoke to in the main social security 
organisations referred explicitly or more obliquely to the view 
that immigrants are less than honest, and that the information 
that they provide has to be closely monitored. One official at 
the C.N.A.F. explained a system that they were testing In one 
departement at the time, whereby the Declarations de Ressources 
would be checked against the Declarations d'Imp6ts, In order to 
eliminate suspected fraud. No-one was able to provide me with 
any substantive evidence to the effect that immigrants made more 
fraudulent social security claims than any other sector of the 
population. The comments that were made to me by such officials 
did, however, appear to indicate the existence of a certain 
amount of prejudice, and attitudes unsympathetic to the ethnic 
minority claimant. More sympathetic commentators suggested 
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firstly that inaccuracies often arose as a result of 
communication problems, and secondly that the need to provide 
such precise information on official forms, as in other aspects 
of their lives, was alien to many people of immigrant origin. 
Inaccurate or missing information in such circumstances, it was 
suggested, may result more from cultural reasons than from a 
deliberate desire to deceive the authorities. 
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3.3 Lan~ua~e and Literacy 
On the basis of the evidence I had gathered there seemed to be a 
clear prima facie case for the existence of two principal 
barriers to the successful claiming of benefits. Firstly, a high 
level of language, literacy and in some cases advocacy skills are 
required throughout the claiming process: access is therefore 
clearly restricted for people whose first language is not French. 
Secondly, the complexity of the process, and the numerous 
dealings with the bureaucracy which are involved may be alien and 
intimidating for claimants with a different cultural background, 
for example, those from rural villages in Algeria. Whilst I have 
selected only two particular benefits to illustrate these points 
in detail there are many others where it was clearly indicated to 
me by professionals working in the field that problems relating 
to the level of language skills are a significant factor. 
To investigate these issues further l attempted to gather some 
basic evidence on take-up of benefits, broken down on the basis 
of nationality and/or ethnic origin. This proved all but 
impossible: it is illegal to keep official records based on 
nationality, and there has been little research done as to non-
take-up of benefits. Officials of the four main social security 
organisations were reluctant to admit the possibility though an 
official at the CPAM de Paris acknowledged that some of the 
peripheral benefits such as medical equipment and 'massages' may 
go unclaimed. (5) 
An additional line of investigation which I pursued concerned the 
provision of translated material and of interpreters by the 
social security organisations. Here again, it proved extremely 
difficult to gather reliable information. CPAM de Paris do 
occasionally use an interpreter service; they used to translate 
leaflets into Yugoslav and Turkish but have discontinued this. 
An official at the CNAF said it was unlikely that any such 
service was provided by the de-centralised semi-autonomous CAFs, 
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communication problems, and secondly that the need to provide 
such precise information on official forms, as in other aspects 
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suggested, may result more from cultural reasons than from a 
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intimidating for claimants with a different cultural background, 
for example, those from rural villages in Algeria. Whilst I have 
selected only two particular benefits to illustrate these points 
in detail there are many others where it was clearly indicated to 
me by professionals working in the field that problems relating 
to the level of language skills are a significant factor. 
To investigate these issues further I attempted to gather some 
basic evidence on take-up of benefits, broken down on the basis 
of nationality and/or ethnic origin. This proved all but 
impossible: it is illegal to keep official records based on 
nationality, and there has been little research done as to non-
take-up of benefits. Officials of the four main social security 
organisations were reluctant to admit the possibility though an 
official at the CPAM de Paris acknowledged that some of the 
peripheral benefits such as medical equipment and 'massages' may 
go unclaimed. (5) 
An additional line of investigation which I pursued concerned the 
provision of translated material and of interpreters by the 
social security organisations. Here again, it proved extremely 
difficult to gather reliable Information. CPAM de Paris do 
occasionally use an interpreter service; they used to translate 
leaflets into Yugoslav and Turkish but have discontinued this. 
An official at the CNAF said it was unlikely that any such 
service was provided by the de-centralised semi-autonomous CAFs, 
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but she was not sure! I sent a questionnaire designed to elicit 
this information from the regional CAFs, but despite an initial 
agreement in principle, the CNAF then declined to circulate it 
(see Appendix IIIl. 
I was however able to collect a virtually complete set of claim 
forms and explanatory leaflets produced by the social security 
organisations, with a view to conducting an analysis to determine 
the level of linguistic difficulty for second language speakers. 
I began by investigating various possible methodologies with the 
aim of developing a stendard against which to assess the range of 
vocabulary and the grammatical complexity of the leaflets and 
claim forms, and therefore their accessibility for people whose 
first language is not French. 
One possible approach was to use the 'Threshold Level', produced 
by linguists for the Council of Europe, as the basis on which to 
develop this standard. (6) This is a list of basic vocabulary 
and exponents in all the European languages concerned, intended as 
a guide to language teachers of competence in the target 
language. This had the advantage of providing an objective 
benchmark, widely accepted as encompassing the common vocabulary 
and exponents necessary for a basic functional command of the 
language, against which to judge the official literature. 
I carried out a test sample on one explanatory leaflet, by 
checking each word or phrase against the Threshold listing. 
Little of the language in the leaflet matched that on the list, 
although much of it was carrying out the same, or similar 
functions. On the face of it, this could be used to argue that 
unnecessarily complex language was being used. However, whilst 
the linguists involved in drawing up the 'Threshold Level' were 
concerned to produce a comprehensive collection of the most 
common vocabulary and expressions used to carry out all necessary 
functions in day to day communication, the aim was to aid 
language teaching. As such, exponents were not only selected on 
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the basis of common usage: economy of construction was another 
major concern. In other words, a grammatical construction could 
be included on the grounds that it could be reused in a variety 
of situations, rather than because it was the most common way of 
expressing a particular idea. Therefore the fact that language 
used in the leaflet did not tally with the Threshold list did not 
necessarily mean that it was not in common usage. 
Other studies produced by/for language teachers held similar 
problems, and it became clear that I could draw on their work 
only to a limited extent. Language teachers are concerned with 
developing in their students the ability to communicate in a 
particular situation, and will analyse the language specifically 
needed for the task, rather than determining standardised levels 
of difficulty. 
An alternative approach that I investigated was to assess the 
leaflets against vocabulary frequency studies, on the basis that 
this would provide an objective measure of language in common 
usage. Vocabulary used in the leaflets and claim forms that was 
not in common usage was likely to make the literature more 
difficult for a second language speaker to understand. The 
nature of language frequency studies meant that I would first of 
all have to draw on a number of pieces of work, and take Into 
account the context and the intention behind them. It would then 
be necessary to break the language down into different functional 
categories in order to assess those cases where an uncommon term 
was used in place of a more usual one. 
This did not appear to be a very satisfactory appro~ch 
since language that is in common usage amongst a particular 
social group or in a particular region may be Inappropriate and 
therefore less common in a different area or cultural setting. 
Furthermore the frequency with which a particular term Is used 
does not necessarily Indicate its level of complexity. This Is 
particularly true In the case of second language speakers who, by 
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translating directly from their first language, may use 
vocabulary or structures which are apparently more difficult/less 
common for a native speaker. 
Detailed assessment of possible methodologies led me to conclude 
that, although there was a wide range of work to draw on, there 
was nothing readily available which would be appropriate to the 
task In hand. It would be necessary for me to develop 
appropriate criteria, and possibly engage in linguistic research 
among the minority communities in France. This was not something 
that was either very practical, or appropriate to my particular 
skills. Furthermore, I doubted that the probable findings would 
necessarily justify the work put in. A quick analysis of any of 
the claim forms or explanatory leaflets demonstrates that the 
language is bureaucratic and complex, and therefore difficult for 
anybody with a low level of literacy. This is obviously a far 
greater problem for people whose first language is not French, 
particularly since a significant number of the first generation 
of North-West African immigrants come from a predominantly oral 
culture and are therefore, in many cases, completely illiterate. 
See for example the leaflet in Appendix IV. This leaflet is part 
of the Carnet de Maternite, referred to in Section 3.2 above. It 
concerns entitlement to supplementary maternity leave, due to 
medical problems arising during pregnancy. The whole of the 
Notice d'lnformation is written in long unwieldy sentences, see 
point 1 under the heading "Attention", at the bottom of the form. 
Quite apart from the bureaucratic language, its numerous sub-
clauses make the meaning particularly difficult to disentangle. 
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3.4 Fear of bureaucracy 
In a series of interviews with professionals working with 
minority groups, it became clear that language and literacy 
problems and lack of competence in an alien bureaucracy may 
represent only a part of the barriers to take up and successful 
claiming of benefits. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that 
many immigrants and members of ethnic minorities have a deep 
mistrust and fear of French officialdom, stemming from actual or 
perceived discriminatory treatment. This perception is apt to be 
strengthened in relation to social security claims, for in many 
cases non-nationals are required to produce proof of satisfactory 
immigration status before a claim can be processed. This is the 
case for family benefits, and in practice <though not in theory) 
for the payment of costs of medical treatment for dependants. 
A certain amount of research exists in the broad area of the 
relationship between Immigrants and the adm!n!strat!on. Based on 
a small-scale C.N.R.S. study on Immigrants' attitudes to a 
number of official forms, Catherine de Wenden has analysed the 
responses aroused. (7) Although these varied depending in part on 
the nationality of the interviewee, common to many were the 
emotions of fear and concern apparently aroused by the endless 
struggle that many face to ensure that their Immigration papers 
are in order. In some ways their first contact with the 
bureaucracy, In the shape of the stringent demands of the 
Interior Ministry before the granting of settled immigration 
status, shaped their response to all subsequent dealings wth the 
bureaucracy. 
While interviewing an official at the Direction Departmentale 
d'Actfon Sanftafre et Sociale CDDASS) In Nanterre who was 
responsible for taking applications from Immigrants to bring 
dependants Into France, and for producing the necessary 'social 
enquiry' reports, I witnessed this phenomonen at first hand. A 
Tunisian in his mid-fifties was applying to bring in his wife and 
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two younger children. The documentation actually required 
consisted of his titre de sejour, proof of his earnings and of 
the accommodation that he had. However, as the interview 
progressed, he pulled out every conceivable piece of official 
looking paper with trembling hands. He was clearly fearful and 
seemed almost to expect a rebuttal, or even an outright refusal 
on the spot. His language skills appeared poor, but this was 
difficult to judge because of the stress he was so obviously 
under. It was impossible not to reflect on the nature of the 
treatment he had received In the past, which appeared to have 
shaped his frightened and submissive attitude. 
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3.5 Discriminatory practices? 
Work carried out by Christian and Myrto Bruschi develops this 
theme from the angle of administrative practice towards 
immigrants and members of ethnic minorities. (8) They argue that 
whatever the legal rights of immigrants may be, administrative 
practice perverts or Ignores these rights by means of internal 
circulars not published in the Journal Officiel, and of verbal 
instructions from superiors. This, they suggest has a hidden 
logic: it acts as a brake on policies considered too generous but 
the Jack of publically available documentation makes it 
sufficiently subtle for it to be difficult to challenge. This, 
they argue, provides the state with an additional means of 
control over potentially disruptive sections of society: by 
keeping people waiting for vital documents, they remain dependant 
on the administration, and will not readily challenge it. The 
consequence of such practices is that, 
L'immigre maghreb!n ou afr!cain ressent la pratique 
administrative dont 11 est vlctime, comme un acte raciste 
s' expl iquant par le couleur de sa peau. <9> 
Examples of the sort of practices referred to by the Bruschis 
include the loss of papers by the administration - be it the 
Prefecture or the CAF: long delays in processing claims and other 
paperwork, with the consequence in both cases that the person 
concerned may give up, or move to another area before anything is 
sorted out. 
The stories that were related to me certainly provided sufficient 
supporting evidence to convince me that this was an area worthy 
of investigation. Examples Included repeated loss of documents 
relating to claims: incorrect or misleading Information 
apparently deliberately given by counter clerks, and hostile and 
even racist behaviour by social security officials. This view 
was reinforced by noting the way In which official discourse 
appears to sanction such practices, with Ministerial statements 
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expressing quite explicitly the idea that in tightening up access 
to the social security system illegal immigration would be 
discouraged. <See Chapter 2) 
A clear example of discriminatory administrative practice 
concerns the requirement to provide proof of proper immigration 
status, or of residence in order to receive benefits. As I noted 
in the previous chapter, there is a requirement for the claimant 
to produce proof of his/her immigration status and that of the 
children, in order to claim Allocations Familiales for a family 
in France. For payment of the costs of medical treatment of 
dependants, proof of residence in France is the only requirement. 
The Hinistre des Affaires Sociales et de Ja Solidarite nationale 
clarified this as follows: 
En !'absence d'obligation legale relative a la nature des 
pieces a fournir, les interesses peuvent utiliser taus 
moyens de preuves et notamment, un titre de sejour pour les 
adultes ou un certificat de scolarite pour les enfants. <IO> 
After seeking clarification of this point with the Caisse 
Primaire d'Assurance Maladie de Paris the CFDT concluded that the 
legal implications of this were as follows. 
Toutefois, en !'absence de dispositions legales limitant a 
ce seul moyen de preuve la verification du caractere 
permanent de la residence, une attestion sur l'honneur 
pourrait etre acceptee, les Centres se reservant ainsi une 
possibilite de recours s'il s'avere par la suite qu'il 
s'agit d'une fausse declaration. <11) 
Administrative practice however frequently demands far more than 
is strictly necessary. For payment of family benefits the 
regional CAPs frequently request proof of proper immigration 
status for both parents, not just for the claimant. For health 
benefits, despite the clear interpretation given by the minister, 
the regional Caisses continue to request a titre de sejour giving 
long term residence rights. In November 1981 GIST! produced a 
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pamphlet on health and social security entitlement for non-
nationals in which they argued that there existed no legal 
justification for such a demand. By September 1984 GIST! felt it 
necessary to produce a further circular for advisors drawing 
their attention to the situation as follows: 
Depuis la publication de ce dossier, nous n'avons cesse de 
contester les pratiques abusives de plusieurs Caisses ou 
Centres de paiement qui s'obstinaient a exiger de la part 
des ayants droit etrangers d'un assure social la 
presentation d'un titre de sejour. <12) 
As I explained in the previous chapter, it may be some time 
before a dependant entering France under the Regroupement 
familial legislation will be given this, partly because only a 
temporary titre is issued initially, and secondly because of long 
administrative delays at many of the Prefectures. The 
consequences of this period during which dependants have no 
health cover are extremely serious, giving rise to unacceptable 
health risks especially in pregnancy and child development. The 
following example is a not untypical illustration. 
Madame A., lndienne, arrive en France en novembre 1984 pour 
se marier. Son mar! reside et travaille regulierement en 
France. Il est assure social depuis le 21 mal 1982. Un 
enfant natt en 1986 a l'hOpital Lariboisiere a Paris. Le 
centre de paiement refuse la prise en charge de 
l'accouchement. Pourtant le m~me centre de paiement accepte 
de considerer comme ayant droit Madame A. a compter du 9 
decembre 1986 <date a laquelle elle a obtenu un titre 
definitif), tout en maintenant son refus de rembourser les 
frais engages anterleurement. (13) 
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3.6 Conclusion 
It became clear to me that in order to document and classify the 
problems faced by immigrants in their dealings with the social 
security administration I needed to carry out some detailed 
survey work. This was especially necessary if I were to move 
beyond the point of collecting anecdotal evidence in a far from 
systematic manner. 
I needed first of all to gather some reliable data on take-up, 
then I wanted to test out the various hypotheses I had formed as 
to probable barriers to claiming benefit by this community. I 
received the agreement of two organisations in the Paris region 
who offer advice, support and representation to ethnic minorities 
and immigrants <Groupe d'information et de soutien des 
travailleurs immigres - GIST! and Association de preorientation 
des travailleurs migrants- APTM, Nanterre>, to carry out 
questionnaire and interview based surveys. However I was aware 
that this alone would not be sufficient. On Its own it would 
achieve little more than adding to the mass of anecdotal evidence 
indicating the need for further systematic research. People who 
go to these organisations for advice and assistance are already, 
by definition, experiencing some sort of difficulty in their 
dealings with the administration. I would need a far broader 
sample Including, in particular, some sort of control group,for 
this approach to be of real value. The ideal approach would have 
been to gain the co-operation of one of the regional social 
security offices. This would have had the advantage of providing 
data on the administration of the claims, as well as first hand 
evidence of interaction between official and claimant. It was 
however unfortunately out of the question to secure this co-
operation. Initial enquiries were met with a somewhat suspicious 
response, despite my presentation of the research in the 
relatively neutral terms of language and literacy problems. 
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Whilst it is impossible to draw detailed conclusions concerning 
this part of my research into the problems faced by immigrants 
and ethnic minorities in gaining access to the social security 
system, have however gathered sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the need for further research in this area, and to 
indicate those approaches which would merit detailed analysis. 
The most interesting, and potentially productive area concerns 
the relationship between the claimant and the social security 
administration, and the extent to which the attitude and practice 
of the officials au guichet constitute a barrier to the take-up 
and successful claiming of benefits. It is also without doubt 
the most sensitive area. Few organisations would be happy to 
acknowledge the possibility of discriminatory or even racist 
practices in their midst. Co-operation from the main social 
security organisations would therefore be very hard to gain, and 
alternative approaches would demand an enormous commitment in 
terms of both people and funds. 
There is also a need, I believe, to go beyond the identification 
of problems of access, to investigate whether, even if such 
barriers were to be removed, the social security system is 
capable of meeting the needs of ethnic minorities appropriately. 
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, this question is 
regarded as an important area of research with groups such as the 
rural elderly, a comparable research effort where ethnic 
minorities are concerned is now long overdue. 
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CHAPTER 3 - NOTES 
<1> I interviewed staff at the following welfare and advice 
agencies in March 1988: 
Groupe d'lnformation et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres 
<GIST!> - Paris 
Centre de Securite Sociale des Travailleurs Migrants CCSSTM> 
- Paris 
Service Social d'Aide aux Emigrants <SSAE> -Paris 
Direction Departmentale d'Action Sanitaire et Sociale 
CDDASS> - Nanterre 
<2> CORDEIRO,A & VERHAEREN,R.E. , Les Travailleurs Immi~res et 
la Securite Soc!ale, Presses Un!versita!res de Grenoble, 
1977, pp95-97 
(3) SSAE, Etran~ers en situation de precar!te, Paris, mars 1986, 
p. 18 
<4> !bid, p. 9 
(5) Official at the Caisse Primeire d'Assurance Meledie de 
Paris, Paris, 25th March 1988 
(6) Conseil d'Europe, Un Niveau Seuil, Hatier 1976 
(7) WITHOL DE WENDEN, Cather!ne, Les Immi~res face a 
!'Administration, Pluriel no 21, 1980 
(8) BRUSCHI,Myrto et Christian, 'Le Pouvoir des Guichets', in 
L' Immigration Ma~hrebine en France, Dossier de la revue, Les 
Temps Modernes, Editions Deno~l, Paris 1984 
<9> !bid, p. 229 
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<10) Reponse Ministerielle no 15938, Journal Official Senat, 
Questions et Reponses du 16 aoOt,p.1285 
<11) GIST!, Situation des Ayants Droit des Travailleurs Immi~res 
au re~ard de !'Assurance Maladie-Maternite, septembre 1984, 
p.2 
<12) !bid, p. 1 
( 13) Plein Droit, no1, octobre 1987, p. 16 
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APPENDIX I 
SECURITE 
SOCIALE CAISSE PRIMAIRE O'ASSURANCE MALADIE 
FEUILLE D'ACCIDENT DU TRAVAIL DU DE MALADIE PROFESSIDNNELLE 
lart1des L 441 5 et 6 • R 441 7 et 8 du code de'- Skunt8 SOC&ale- Dkret du 17 12 1986) 
UTILISATION DE L'IMPRIME 
1"' L'EMPLOYEUR dolt: 
a.· au moment de la d6ilvrance de la feurlle : mentronner la date de la delivrance, remplrr les 
cadres uvlctlme», cemployeuno, «accident ou maladle professlonnellert et remettre 
l'rmprrme complet 6 la vrctrme ou 6 son repr6sentant 111; 
b . au moment de la rapnse du travail, remplir, au recto du volet n°1, le cadre clnterruptlon 
du travail»; 
c.· en caa de rechute,l'employeur n'a pas quailte pour d61rvrer la feurlle. L'assu~ la rklame 
au Cantre de parement auquel rl dort presenter un certrficat medical de constatation. 
:Z. LA VICTIME (ou son repr6aententl dolt : 
a.- presenter l'rmprrme au pratlcren 6 chaque consultaton et, le cas kMant, 6 l'hOprtal, 6 
l'auxrilarre m<ldrcal, arnsr qu'au pharmacren ou au foumrsseur chaque fors qu'une ordon-
nance est exkutee : 
b.- conserver le volet n•1 Jusqu'61a cessation des soins (vorr «d» ci-dessousl purs farre remplir 
le cadre «Interruption du travail» par l'ernployeur et l'adresser ou le rernettre au centre 
de Skurite socrale. 
c.- remettre : 
- le volet n•2 au praticien qui constate l'accrdent ou la maladie professronnelle, ou, le cas 
kheent, 6 I' 6tablissement hosprtailer ; 
- le volet n•3 au pharmacren ou au foumrsseur qur exkute la premrere ordonnance ; 
d.· srle verso du volet n°1 est entl~rement rempil avant la fin des sorns, l'adresser au centre de 
S6cunt6 soc&ale apr8s avo1r rempli le cadre cdemande de renouvellement»; 
e.- en cas de rechute, demander une feuille d'accrdent au servrce local «Accrdents du 
Travarl», l'employeur n'ayent pas quailte pour delivrer la feurlle dans ce cas; 
f.- la vrctrme ne dort pas qurtter la crrconscnptlon de la Carsse pnmarre sans I' accord preelable 
de celle-cr. Elle dart respecter lea heures de some autons6es (de 10 6 12 h. le matln et de 16 
6 18 h. l'aprM-mrdr). 
3" LE PRATICIEN ET LE PHARMACIEN dolvent : 
a.· remplir le recto du volet qui leur est respectJVement dest.n6 et, au verso, mscnre le 
d6compte des actes m6chcaux ou des foum1tures ; 
b.- pour le reglement des honorarres, adresser 61'organrsme ou 61'entraprise autonsrle 6 gerer 
le nsque accrdents du travarl, ea vole!, ou 6 defaut, une note d'honorarres qur en raprodurt 
toutes les 1ndacations. 
c.· en outre, la pratJoen est tenu d' 6tabhr, en double exempla1ra ; 
- d'une part, un certrficat m<ldrcalrnrtial, S 6902. rndiquant l'etat de la vrctrrne et la dur6e 
probable de l'rncapacrte ternporarre; 
-d'autre part, un certrficat m<ldrcel de guerrson ou de consolidation, S. 6903, rndiquant 
les consequences d<lfinrtJves de I' accrdent. 
Cans les 24 heures, l'un des exemplarres sera remrs a la victlme, I' autre sera adresse a l'orga-
nlsme gest1onna1re. 
Dispositions partlcull6res aux maladies professlonnelles (voir au verso) 
(1) Cette formaht6 ne diSpense pas l'employeur de l'enYOI A: la ca.sse pnmalre d'assurance maladle ou. 
l'orgamsme dont ral•ve la v•ct•ma, des tro•s exampla•res de la d~claratlon d'acc•dent (S 6200 c), prtlvue 
aux articles L. 441.1 2.3 et R 441 2.3 du code deS. S., mAme SI un arrtt de travail n'est pas oKessa1re 
A. T FeUIIIe d'A T ou de maledte profeSSJonnslle. CERFA 80/02248 I fi1 CPAM 00 06201 8 
Ill. 
DISPOSITIONS PARTICULIERES 
AUX MALADIES PROFESSIONNELLES 
la formailte de fa declaratiOn incombe a fa VICtlme elfe-meme. 
Cette declaration doit etre accompagnee de deux exemplaires du cert1frcat 
med1cal de constatation. 
le cas echeant, les valets de soms sent delivres par la Ca1sse pnma1re 
d'assurance maladie et non par l'employeur. 
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1 
F 11 d~l 6el BUI 8 M e 
VICTIME 
cl6 
I I I I I I l_j SPECH\1EN N• 
Nurn6t'o d •mmatneulahon 
Nom 
(En earactllres d'•mpnmena) .. Arrondlssement ou commune 
... Nom de JBUne f11le o( I (S 11 y a l•eu) 
Pr6noms 
Les cot1sat1ons A. T. ont 6tct verses ~ la 
c P de 06panement 
E"MPLOYEUR 
I I Nom. ratson soc1ale. adresse de I I I l'entrepnse 
Num8ro d •mmatnculatlon 
L'entrepnse a-t-elle ~t6 autonde a gt.\rer 
le nsque accidents du travad 1 
ACCIDENT OU MALADIE PROFESSIONNELLE 
Acc1dent du ------ Heure (0 & 24) --- ~ Oklar~ le 
Ala CP. de 
O~clar~e le 
Malad1e protess1onnelle constatt\e le A la C.P. de 
l6S1ons J Nature S16ge 
-
INTERRUPTION DU TRAVAIL 
(A rempbr par I employeur klrs de la repnse du travail) 
... ~f Je SOUSSignct attests que le trava1l i•l= 
mterrompu le 
--
19 
-
eC .s 
a 6t6 repns le 
-
19 
--
~cJ'ic 
··-~ A _______ le -------- 19 ~ .... 
- ~'i! Signature et cachet de ramployaut. 
..:c-.. i !;:' i 
11.! .. 
OEMANDE DE RENOUVELLEMENT , .... : 
(A rempltr par la VICttme SI la feUille est ent1~rement utths6e avant la f1n =~-~~ ~·o"i des soms ou du trauement). :.§a~ 
VeUillez m'adresser une nouvelle feutlle d'acctdent ou de maladte pro· gJ!:;.! 
fess1onnelle "' U> .. e ·-~~ Nom. prtSnom -.~~ .. 
-
; .. .: 
- :t .. Adresse __ ~ .'0 
S•gnature • .... 0 
C P A M LegtslstJon sur Jes scctdenrs du travatl (Code de S S, sn L 441·5 et 6- R 441 7 et 8) 
11 4-
TRAITEMENT 
Dur~e probable 
Date 
des actes 
med•caux 
1ours 
D6slgn&tl0n 
C Consul 
V V1S1te 
p c out::: 
SUI\/30{ 
nomenclat 
ARRET DU TRAVAIL 
Date d'mterruptton ----
Dun~e du repos ______ _ 
1 ~~pos fra1s 
2 Chambre dJb~~~:~~t 
3 Sortie k•lom6tres 
4 Pasd an~t pa<co <US 
de travail u 
06hvrance 
dune 
ordonnance 
Ollhvrance 
du 
cert f1cat 
m6chcal 
=lj· ·---···-·· 11= 
.:lj --- "" ----------
:; - -- ----- --
PROLONGATION SORTIE AUTORISEE 
Our~e de la prolongation du repos Oe" ___ H heures __ _ 
06pas-
sement 
d'honora•res 
(1) 
S•gnature 
du m&decm 
all&stant la 
prestat•on des 
actes m6d•caux 
A _____ H heures 
EXECUTION DES OADONNANCES 
Montant 
de Ja facture 
Cachet du pharmac.en 
ou du fourn1sseur 
--1----- --------
------------ -·-----
(1) En cas de dOpassament des tanfs, les pratiCJens devront .nscnre la lenre «0» dans la colonne cDepassement d'honor111ren 
AVIS TRES IMPORTANT Code de le S6curit6 soclale, art L 432- 3- :Z. ahn6a In prat1clana et aux1halrea m6d1caux ne peuvent demander d'honoralraa A la vie-
time qu1 pr6aantala feu•lle d'accldant, sauf la cu de d6paaaement de tarlf dalll lea conditions prltvu• • rart L 162- 36 Code deS~ S • et danflll masure de ea 
dltpaaaement 
\.{) 
+ 
.. 
. t 
z 
eUIIIe de le 
VICTIME 
cl6 Rue 
-
I I I I I !_j I N• 11 
-Numtko d'•mmatrieulatton • SPECII\i.:l\1 
Nom • 11 Arrond1ssement ~· (En caracttret d"•mpnmene) .. uno 
Nom de Jeune f1lle ... 
(S 11 y a l•au) 
"' I Pr~noms 
Les COt1sat1ons A. T. ont 8tti versees lJ la 
C. P. de 08partement 
EMPLOYEUR 
I I Nom, rarson soc1ale, adresse de I I I I' entrepnse 
Num6ro d 1mmatnculatJon 
l'entrepnse a-t-elle 8M autons8e l gtirer 
le rrsque acc1dents du trava1l? 
ACCIDENT OU MALADIE PROFESSJONNELLE 
Accident du Heure (0 ~ 24) --1 Odclar6 le 
Ala CP. de 
Ddclarde le 
Maladae profess1onnelle constattie le A la c P. de 
f Nature 
L6s1ons S•~ge 
A REM PUR PAR LE PRATICIEN 
Je souss1gnll. d8clare que pour 1'acc1dent d8s1gn8 c1-dessus, les acres 
.! 
m8dtcaux mdtques au verso ant 8t6 d1spenses et que decompt6s au .. H 
tanf mm1sMnel en v1gueur en mat1ere d'acc1dents du travail, liS . .... a.z e• 
I I '"'w 11 "" s'81Went A la somme global a de F .. __ 0 !!u oc --~0 r Cachet du pratrc1en .... ;a- ... 
Fa1t • le :J c( •• 
S1gnature .. =-· ......
.. 
" Le pratteten appel6 & mtervenrr auprk de la V!ctlme " oe 0 ..... 8dresse les certlfrcats et notes d honorarres il la Carsse > \. J dans la etrconscrrpt1on de laquetle sontdonnhles 501ns. 
AVIS TRES IMPORTANT. Les p18ces annax6as dOIVent, sous pelne de reret lndlquer lisiblement lea nom, 
prllnoms, adresse et num6ro matricule de la vlctlme La r6glement raplde des honoralres estl16 Ala bonna 
pr6sentation des notes de fra1s 
Adressez chaque mois voa relev8s. 
Adressez chaque JOUr les certrficats m8drcaux. 
ilb 
Data 
de !'act• 
tn6d1CII 
A REMPLIR PAR LE PRATICIEN 
06s•gnat•on 
de l'tete m•d•cal d11pens6 
Fra1s 
do 
d6pla· 
cement 
(Nombfe 
de km) 
06h· 
vrance 
dune 
ordon· 
nance 
(o) 
CertJ-
f•cat 
mid1cal 
1---1---------1---1-- ---
L:l6eompte 
du 
m6dean 
-- --- ------
-----1-------·-- ---
-----
1----1------·---1---1-
1------1--------1--
TOTAL •• 
A REM PUR PAR LA CAISSE (04tail du r~glement) 
Nombfe 
d actn 
d•spenUI 
Ouantlt6 Co<lo Pnx UAitalr. Monwnt 
----1----1----1------1 
------1--- -·--1-------
---- ----1---------
TOTAL ••• f--------1 
NurMro d'acc1dent Prestat1ons non r6gt6es 
L. 
Nom de l'acc1dent6 ------------------·· 
Pout 11 O~tiCIIIUI' : Pour I Agent comptable! 
• 
• 
• 
3 
F 11 d41 4e I SUI 8 M • 
VlcnME 
cl6 Rue 
I I I I I I !__j N• 
• ----Num6t'o d'lmmatnculat•on • 
• Nom • (En caract.,n d •mpnmene) .. Arrond1ssement ou commune 
Nom de JeUne f1lle "CC 
(S •I v a heu) < I Prl!noms 
Los cot1sat1ons A. T. ont 4t4 vers4es 6 la 
c. p de D4partement 
EMPLOYEUR 
I I Nom, ra1son soclale. adressa da I I I rentrepns 
Num6ro d •mmatneulatton SPECli\1EN L"entrepnse a-t·elle 4t4 autons4e 6 g4rer 
le nsque acc1dents du travail? 
ACCIDENT OU MALADIE PROFESSIONNELLE 
Acc1dent du Heure (0 6 24) --I D~clar4 le 
AlaCPde 
Malad1e profess•onnelle constatl!e le 
D4clarh le 
·-
A la C.P. do 
~ Nature 
L4Sions 5,~ge 
- A REM PUR PAR LE PHARMACIEN OU LE FOURNISSEUR -
Ja SOUSSIQ06 dl!clare que pour 1'acc1denr d~s1gnd c1-dessus les four- !! 
n1tures prescrrtes par les ordonnances CI·Jo.ntes ont ~t6 d6hvrees. er que 
.: ~ 
d6compt6es au tanf mmJstl!r•el en v•gueur en matu~re d acc•dents du ""='~ :iz i..! 
I I G.w lll • trava11. elles s'616vent A la somme globale de F IIU!!'CI •.ea .. 
r Cachet du ptwmac1en ' =:.;i 
..:a:.2& ou du tourmsseur Fa1t ~ .le ____ 
" 
ac • 
.. :z:~C» S1gnature =a. ':Ill'! 
Le pharmac1en ou fourn1sseur appelf A mtervenLr aupr6s -; ..e..!! > ; de la VLCILme adreSSI leS factures i 11 Ca1SS8 dans la CLC· 
\,. 
.J conscnpt10n de laQuelle sont donn6s les soms Q ... 
AVIS TRES IMPORTANT.- Lee plk" ennexMe dolvent. sous pelne de rejet. lndlquer hs•b•ament 
'" nom, pr•nome, edrtiH e1 num6ro meUIGule de I• vlctlme. Le r•glement uptde eat IIQ a le 
bonne pr ... ntiLtlon des notes de frele. • 
Adressez cheque mois vos relev's. 
ll ~ 
A REMPLIR PAR LE PHARMACIEN OU LE FOURNISSEUR 
Ordonnance du Montant 
- ------1------- -------------
------1-----------
--------------1------- ---------------
-----
-----------1-------
----------1-----1-==========-1 
TOTAL •• 
------- -------· ----
Les tourntrures effecruties dOJvtmt dtr11 dtiUIJ/14tls SI les ordonnences ne sonr piiS 10mtes. 
A REMPLIR PAR LA CAISSE (CMta•l du reglement) 
Code Nature des prestat1ons Montant 
------1-------------
------1-------- ----------
TOTAL 
- = 
Numero d acc•dent 
L-- ___ _j 
Nom de I acc•dente 
Pour lfl 01tfiCC9UI' 
119 
Prestattons non regh~es 
r--l · ---=.::....=..:....::.....=...~ 
r 
21 
APPEND I;><. 1[ 
SPECIMEN 
FEUILLE 
o·EXAMEN PRENATAL 
2" EXAMEN 
Quand devez-vous /'utiliser? 
Au coura du 8" mola de votre groaaeaae. 
Que devez-vous en faire ? 
Si l"exsmen a ete sub1 chez un pratlclen partlculler, 
presentez ou envoyez cette feullle 
A VOTRE CENTRE DE SI!CURITI! SOCIALE 
VOIR AU DOS 
I 2.0 
R SERV AUX PRATICIENS ,--
PRESTATION DES ACTES PAIEMENT DES ACTES 
ldenttftcatton du m~dec.n, de la sage-femme, de fots•gn••o Montant E Fnusde Signature (en francs) "~~ d6plecement Signature l'~tabllssement ou du centre de P.M.I. Oate des actes attestant des ol' t::?XJ Pf' des ~tvant no- ocon attestant prestat1on honoraires le IICtH :f~ ~~.~ r:.:r menclature des IICtH oe«U• pattment .., 
' 
D~hvrance d'une ordonnance 11) 
Examen pulmonaire radtographrque 
ou radoophotographoque (21 
f 
( 
.. 
r.':- RtSERVt AU LABORATOIRE 
Album•nune, Glycosurte, Ant•corps d'tso-tmmumsatlon 
N'oub/tez Pill de jomd,_ IBI p,.tJCrtptlonl COIICflmant la' fiX8tfHIM tJ. labo,.tol,. 
L'examen relat•f a la recherche et au tttrege des andcorps d'lso-lmmunlsatton est obhgatotra si la future mire a llt6 reconnue Rhllsus n'slat1f, 
1011 an cas de premu)re g.ossesse, 1011 au cours d"une pr6c6denta groueue. 
(t J SI uM ordonn.nc. a tJfl cM/wrH la ,.nflc.t10n •n .,. nJPOrfH p.r le pharm«Hm sur un voltt de hlctu,.tton • jomd,..w pnlunt feul/ltt 
et lt rtmbounement d11r fratr pharmiK:fluttqufll rera tJffscru4 aor condttJonr de I'IISWrance tmiiKiltJ. 
(2) A l't~xcluston de tout exam~~n rtldloscopiqut, er SBUitJITHint dan1 lt car oil far lndtcattOnl parttcu/N}rer le }Ustdtent 
SPEarMEN 
Note cflnformation 
6 r attention des assur61 10e:iaux 
Objet: INSTITUTION D'UNE ALLOCATION AU JEUNE ENFANT 
En application de la Lot n• 85-17 du 4 janvter 1985, relative aux mesures en 
faveur des Jeunes fa m tiles et des famtlles nombreuses, tl a ete institue une allo-
cation au jeune enfant qui remplace les allocations pre et postnatales amst que 
les primes d'allaitement et bons de lait. 
L' allocation au jeune enfant est versee taus les mois a parttr du 4'm• mats 
de grossesse Jusqu'au 3'mo mois de I' enfant pour toutes les mares et Jusqu'a 3 
ans st Jes ressources sont inferieures a un certain plafond. 
Le carnet de maternite qui vient de vous 6tre remis ne comporte pas 
encore les nouveaux feutllets consecuttfs a ce changement. 
EN CONS~QUENCE : 
- 11 convient de hre : 
• ALLOCATION AU JEUNE ENFANT" au lieu de 
"allocattons prenatales• ou "allocattons postnatales• 
sur les feutllets numerates 3, 5, 6 (feuilles d'examen prenatal), 8 (fiche famthale 
d'etat-civtl), 11, 26,28 (feu tiles de survetllance medica le de I' enfant) et 9 et 11 de 
la nottce d'informat1on Jaune. 
-En outre, tl n'est plus necessaire de faire etabhr un CERTIFICAT D'ALLAITE-
MENT, comme mdique sur les feutlles de surveillance medtcale de I' enfant 
numerotees 14, 17, 19,21 et a fa page 11 de fa notiCe d'informattOn Jaune. 
De ce fatt, les certtficats d'allaitement correspond ant aux pages 15, 18, 20 et 22 
ont ete extratts du prtlsentcarnet 
\1.2. 
FEUILLE 
D'EXAMEN PRENATAL 
2" EXAMEN 
Quand devez-vous /'utiliser? 
Au cours du tr mole de votre groa1e1ae. 
N' oubhez pas de completer le verso de celle feuille. 
Que devez-vous en faire ? 
Envoyez cette feu•lle des que l'examen a ete sub• et au plus tard 
dans les 15 jours su•vant la fln du 6" mo•s de votre grossesae, • vccre 
CAISSE OU ORGANISME D' ALLOCATIONS FAMILIALES. 
Son envo1 cond1tlonne le versement des mensuallt6s 
d'ALLOCATIONS PAENATALES correspondent a cet examen. 
VOIR AU DOS 
I 2. 3 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
,..- R£SERV£ AUX PRATICIENS 
DATE DE L" ACTE s •9nf!uo':e~t~ f:ri~ t'd~ep :J~est ant ldenttftcat1on du m6decm, de la sage femme, de 
l"~tabhssement ou du centre de PM I. 
Une rechograph•e ( 1) A £n:- N' A PAS £T£ prescnte 
S1gn•rure 
Date 
(t} R11ver /11 ment1on mutrle 
Examen pulmonatre rad•ograph1que ou radtophotographtque 
I 
·! 
,..- R£SERV£ AU LABORATOIRE 
Albumtnune, Glycosune, Anttcorps d'tso·•mmun~sataon 
. ' 
' J 
L'examen relauf 6 la recherche et au t•trege des antteorps d"1so-1mmumsat•on est obhgato•re •• la future mare a lit• reconnue Rh•sus migat1f, soat 
en cas de prem1tre groueue, loJit eu court d'une prk'dente groneue 
~. R£SERV£ A L"ALLOCATAIRE 
N° d' Allocatatre de votre famdle ilia catsse 
ou a I'Croamsme d' Allocattons Fam1llales · 
Dl!stgnatton de I'Or9amsme ay ant ventS 
la Ure fractton de I allocatton pr~natale 
Si le Chef de Famille ert sal1r16 : Profea•on 
Nom et adresse de l'employeur actuel : 
QUESTIONNAIRE SUR L'ACCES DES MINORITES ETHNIOUES A LA PROTECTION SOCIALE 
Cette questionnaire fait partie du programme de recherches universitaires 
<Loughborough University of Technology- Angleterrel sur l'acces des 
minorites ethniques a la protection sociale. 
Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de-------------------
1> Est-ce que votre Caisse utilise 
Non Q>ui 
lrEst-ce que vous assurez 
Non 
Dans quelles circonstances 
employez-vous un interprete? 
des interpretes? 
des permanences reguliers? 
rfloui 
4~cisez s.v.p. 
alLa/les Jangue<sl 
blLa frequence 
clLe lieu des permanances 
dlComment vous avertissez le public 
2> Est-ce que vous faites traduire en langue etrangere les depliants 
destines au public? 
Non rDOui 
~Precisez s.v.p. 
Le<sl depliant<sl Traduits en quelle(sl langues 
al ______________________ ___ 
bl ____________________ ___ 
cl ______________________ ___ 
Voir au verso ...... . 
115 
--------
(3) Est-ce que vous prenez d'autres mesures pour alder les ~trangers et 
leurs famllles A comprendre leurs drolts aux prestations famlllales? 
Merci de votre cooperation. 
l;l..t, 
APP£NDI)( TIL 
NOTICE D'INFORMATION-
Le repos prenatal debuta 6 semaones, soot 4Z rours; mnr la date pt6vue d& 
votre accouchement 
Toutefoos, une pen ode supplementaore de repos·d'unoi duree MAXIMUM DE 
2 SEMAINES peut ~tre attrobuee avant l'accoucheroont en cas d'etat pathologoque • 
RESULTANTDEVOTREGROSSESSI!;,' __ . J 
Cene penode doot faore l'obtet d'une prescroptlon de votre mecteCon et peut debuter- 1 des la declaratoon de grossesse. · .• · · • • · · _ • - • · • 
So. lors de votre ou de vas ar~t tst de~~~.~~ exefcei ~ actovite salaries jj 
(ou SI vous ~tes en sotuatoon de maladie. accid.ent,du travaot:.chOmage- constate. 
locencoement, cong!s payes, etc ) vous pouvez' solliciter l'attrobution d'lndemnitds 
joumaliires. Pour eel a, ol vous faut satosfa,lll! a Certaines c;oilditiont, -· :, _- .- - • 
~ ~ ~~J a S3V01r I • ", ·, • _"' , ~ 
n 'avoor pas perdu la quahte d'assuree soclale depuis ptusd& ~2moos,· ' -
~ 'j~ ~, ~ - • ~ 
JUstafaer • ... ...-:-- ~~,-.. :..~~, "_....",.;-;,/ - ~- , . , 
-de 200 h de travaol salane ou· assimol6 au cours du. frimes~ civil_ ou des: 
, . 
3moosdedateadatepr!lcedantsoot. , _;, , , _- ·" ' 
ladatepresumeedelaconceptoon. :·:.': .,._ " _._,_ 1 
le 42eme tour precedant la date presumee'ila i'aCcoUchement. - ·· · i 
venant avant le 42eme JOUr (debut du repos p.enatatt :. - ·- - - -
la date reelle de l'accouchement, en cas ;d'accouchement pren'Jaturd sur· _.
1
, 
ou - avoor cotose (cotosatoon ouvnere malado~, matemrt.i;1nvaiod(t6-~t decest sur, 
un salaore au moons <!gal fl 1 040 foos.laSMIC horaore au cow·s des 6 moos 
ciVIIs precedant la date retenue pour l'examen des droots aux prestations en , 
~. - . ·'- - ~ ~tre ommamculi!e depuos au moins 1a moil a la date prnvue de votre accou· 
chement -· 
Si vous ~tes salanee a la date de conception et que vous cessez votre travaol 
avant le debut du repos prenatal, sans vous trouver dans une sotuatoon assomolee a du 
travaol salane, renseognez-vous aupres de votre Centre de St!cunte Socoale pour con· 
naitre les condotoons partocuheresvous concemant., · · 
,..--------ATTENTION--------. 
1. L'lndemnisatlon lo!gale, au titre dei'IIIUnlnce matemit6, est accord4e, 
dlls l'arrft de travail, maos sans pouvoor atre attrobuee avaot le debut 
du repos prenatal tel que defim co-dessus, sauf SI l'accouchement a 
lieu anteneurement a cette date, ou so une penode supplementaore de 
repos a ate prescnte 
2. Les ondemnotes JOurnalo~res sont dues a condotoon de cesser toute 
actovote professoonnelle pendant au mains S semaines. Dans le cas 
contra1re, vous n'avez pas droit aux 1ndemn1t~ JOurnalu~res 

